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Article XII, section 2 of the Ohio Constitution provides: "[G]eneral laws
may be passed to exempt burying grounds, public school houses, houses used
exclusively for public worship, institutions used exclusively for charitable
purposes, and public property used exclusively for any public purpose...."
I. INTRODUCTION
Although much has been written about taxation in the State of Ohio, there
has never been published a comprehensive study of Ohio's real property tax
exemption law. The large body of case law in this area and the visible absence
of commentary is perhaps indicative of the complexity of the subject matter.
Ohio's tax system has been described as "not really a system at all but a
hodgepodge of constitutional provisions and statutes resulting from the
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demands for revenue and the pressures for exemption." 1 Article XII, section 2
of the Ohio Constitution grants to the legislature permissive authority to enact
specific exemptions at its own discretion, within the parameters set by the
constitution's language.
The purpose of real property tax exemption statutes is to describe the
specific types of property that may be exempted from taxation. Therefore, the
exemption statutes are statutes of description. Real property may be described
in a number of different ways. For purposes of Ohio's exemption statutes,
exemption may be based on one or more of the following descriptive
categorizations: (1) ownership of the property by a particular type of
institution; (2) use of the property for an exempt purpose; (3) or some attribute
of the property itself, such as its historic value,2 its location,3 or its
significance.4
Exemption statutes in Ohio are based on all three of the aforementioned
categories. The primary statutes (those which apply to ninety percent of all
exemptions granted in Ohio) are based on the use of the property for an exempt
purpose. These exemption statutes have historically required the property to be
devoted to or used for an exempt purpose. The fundamental policy decision
made by the legislature when enacting an exemption statute is whether the
exemption will be based upon the use of the property, or upon some other
criteria. Does the property, in order to obtain tax exemption, have to be used
for a charitable purpose, for an educational purpose, for a public purpose, or
for public worship; or may it be exempted on some other requirement? The
legislature must consider these issues when enacting exemptions.
Ohio's present statutory scheme of tax exemptions is a patchwork
combination of statutes containing sections first enacted in the early 1800s and
amended over the years in a haphazard and irregular way. There has not been a
recodification or comprehensive review of Ohio's tax exemption provisions
since 1852. The statutes in existence today are full of contradictions and
inconsistencies. For example, the statutory language granting tax exemption to
the property of state university branch campuses appears to be broader in scope
than the statute applying to main campus universities. 5 The apparent
1 Lloyd E. Fisher, Jr., Charities and the Ohio Tax Law, 18 OHIO ST. L.J. 228 (1957).
2 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5709.18 (Anderson 1986) (exemption of prehistoric
earthworks or historic buildings).
3 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1728.10 (Anderson 1986) (property must be located in
"blighted" area).
4 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5709.17 (Anderson 1986) (exemption of lands held by
memorial organizations).
5 Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3355.11 (Anderson 1986) (exemptions for
university branch districts) with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3345.17 (Anderson 1986)
(exemptions for Main Campus Universities). The university branch district exemption
applies to "any... property acquired, owned, or used by it [the university branch district]"
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inconsistency in the wording of these statutes illustrates the confusion created
by Ohio's statutory exemption scheme.
Between 1851 and 1965 the Ohio Supreme Court decided over 120 cases
dealing with the educational, religious, charitable, and public property
exemption statutes. These cases dealt with a wide variety of fact situations and
provided a valuable body of case law which was used by state administrative
agencies, lower courts, and those entities seeking exemption. This body of case
law has been recognized, followed, and cited by many other states since the
late 1800s. During this time period, Ohio's tax exemption system was studied
by and served as a model for numerous states which were modernizing their
exemption statutes. Most substantive exemption questions had been resolved by
these cases and Ohio was served well by having a uniform and consistent
policy with respect to real property tax exemptions.
Since 1816 the laws of Ohio, and since 1851 the Constitution of Ohio,
have been interpreted to require, without exception, that property be used for
an exempt purpose in order to be exempt from taxation. That precedent,
however, was suddenly reversed in 1965 by the Ohio Supreme Court in a
decision that affected the interpretation of many of the existing statutes
contained in the Ohio Revised Code at that time.
In 1965 the Ohio Supreme Court overruled part of this extensive body of
case law and rewrote one of the state's major exemption statutes 6 which had
been in existence since 1852. In Denison University v. Board of Tax Appeals,7
the court held that the Ohio Constitution was not, or was no longer, a
limitation on the power of the General Assembly to enact exemption statutes.8
In essence, the court discarded the five specifically enumerated exemptions
contained in article XII, section 2 of the Ohio Constitution, giving the General
Assembly plenary power subject only to constitutional provisions, such as the
equal protection clause. The court's holding appears to be the result of a 1931
amendment to article XII, section 2 of Ohio's Constitution which removed the
restrictions that the 1912 amendment had placed on the General Assembly's
power to grant exemptions. Two questions remain unanswered today: First,
why did the court wait thirty-four years to come to this conclusion; and second,
what facts in Denison University were so compelling that the Ohio Supreme
Court discarded over 150 years of solid case law.
Even though Denison University only involved an exemption for college-
owned property under Ohio Revised Code section 5709.07, the problems that
arose after the decision pervaded all real property tax exemption statutes. The
primary problem involved the interpretation of existing statutes once the court
while the state university exemption applies only to property "used for the support of such
institution." There is no such use limitation on the exemption for university branch districts.
6 QoO REV. CODE ANN. § 5709.07 (Anderson 1986).
7 205 N.E.2d 896 (1965).
8 Id.
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held that the constitution was no longer a limitation on the meaning of those
statutes. A major portion of Ohio's real property tax exemption statutes were
enacted before the 1931 constitutional amendment dealt with in Denison
University. The question after Denison University was how to interpret those
statutes once the constitution was removed from the picture altogether.
Between 1974 and 1982 the Ohio Supreme Court abandoned virtually all of
its previous decisions rendered from 1837 until 1969. The court expanded the
exemptions that may be granted to such an extent that the credibility of Ohio's
real property tax exemption system is now in danger. It has now become
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the state to administer its real
property tax exemption system since the statutory meaning of much of the
exemption language remains unclear.
During tax year 1989 Ohio had $86.5 billion of real property value that
was taxable.9 Approximately $14.5 billion of real property value was exempted
from taxation by authority of the Ohio Constitution and the Ohio Revised
Code.' 0 Tax revenue loss due to these exemptions in 1989 was approximately
$717 million."
In order to resolve the present ambiguity in Ohio's real property tax
exemption statutes, the legislature should clarify individual statutes and
consolidate the exemption provisions into one chapter of the Ohio Revised
Code. Creation of a more logical structure would diminish ambiguity and
lessen. confusion.
The purpose of this Note is to provide a comprehensive study of Ohio's
real property tax exemption statutes, case law, and constitutional provisions in
an attempt to set forth decided points of law and illustrate the confusion which
still exists in many areas of real property tax exemptions. In order to present an
accurate picture of how Ohio has arrived at its current real property tax
exemption system, this Note will examine the historical developments in real
property tax exemption law and analyze legislative enactments, judicial
decisions, and administrative actions which have changed the previous course
of the law.
This Note presents an in-depth analysis of the four major areas of Ohio's
real property tax exemptions: educational exemptions, religious exemptions,
charitable exemptions, and public purpose exemptions. Real property tax
exemptions for educational purposes are discussed in Section II of the Note.
Section III examines the various considerations involved in granting exemptions
for property used for religious purposes. Section IV explores the most
controversial real property tax exemptions-those granted to charitable
institutions. Section V examines the exemption of real property used for public
9 OHO DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION, TAX DATA SERIES, PuB. No. 46, Table PE-2
(Oct. 16, 1990).
10 Id.
11Id.
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purposes. It becomes increasingly clear that exemptions in each of these areas
are paradoxically dependent on and independent of what is occurring in the
other areas of Ohio's real property tax exemption laws.
I. TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES
The history of tax exemptions for educational purposes in Ohio begins with
the foundation for the common schools of Ohio as set forth in the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787.12 Members of the 1802 Constitutional Convention
incorporated an almost verbatim clause into Ohio's first constitution. 13
Although the 1802 Constitution did not contain specific exemption provisions,
the general principle was that property was exempt if it was not designated as
taxable. The first legislative enactment specifically exempting property used for
educational purposes was the Act of March 14, 1831.14
The first challenge to the education exemption occurred in 1837 when
Kenyon College challenged the taxing of a college-owned professor's house
situated on the institution's property. Is In denying the exemption, the court said
that "[i]t is not enough that the person residing in the house is one of the
teachers; it must be shown that the building is occupied for literary
purposes." 16
In 1850 the Ohio Supreme Court was asked to construe the 1848 tax law
provisions in Cincinnati College v. State.'7 Cincinnati College had obtained the
property at issue from First Presbyterian Church through a perpetual lease
which contained a clause restricting use of the property to educational
purposes. Eventually the college purchased the land in fee simple, but the deed
retained the earlier lease provision that the property would be used for the
support of a college or institution of learning. 18 The original building was
12 NORTHWEST ORDINANCE of 1787, art. 111, 1 Stat. 51 (1787) ("Religion, morality,
and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools
and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.").
13 OfHo CONST. of 1802, art. VIII, § 3 ("But religion, morality and knowledge, being
essentially necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the
means of instruction shall forever be encouraged by legislative provision, not inconsistent
with the rights of conscience.").
14 1831 Ohio Laws 272-73 ("[Al lots of land or ground set apart for school houses,
academies or colleges, with the buildings thereon occupied for those purposes; and all
lands, the property of any such academy, or other seminary of learning, which now is, or
may hereafter be established in this State, including all lands granted by Congress for the
use of schools, academies, colleges and for religious purposes; but the buildings, or any of
them, not occupied for literary purposes, may be taxed...").
15 Kendrick v. Farquhar, 8 Ohio 189 (1837).16 Id. at 197.
17 19 Ohio 110 (1850).
18 Id. at 110-12.
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destroyed by fire, but the college obtained private donations to erect a new
structure. 19 The first floor was rented to various merchants for retail and
business activities. A suite of rooms on the second floor was occupied by a
literary and scientific society with the remainder of the rooms being used for
lecture rooms and private rooms for students.20 The state auditor denied the
college's application for exemption and the college appealed. 21 Cincinnati
College officials argued vigorously that, although the property's immediate use
was not for "literary or scientific purposes," the lease income was
"appropriated solely to sustaining" the college.22 In upholding the auditor's
denial, the court made it clear that property used solely for the production of
revenue should be subject to taxation, regardless of ownership. 23
If the court had reversed the auditor's ruling, it would have given the
merchants occupying the premises an undue advantage over others similarly
situated. Regarding statutory interpretation, the court took the position "that all
laws that exempt any of the property of the community from taxation should
receive a strict construction. All such laws are in derogation of equal rights." 24
In Cincinnati College, the court focused on the exclusive use of property
for scientific or literary purposes and the statutory prohibition against leasing
or otherwise using the exempt property with a view to profit. Nearly 150 years
later, the Ohio Supreme Court was faced with a case involving virtually the
same facts, but it granted the exemption. 25 These diametrically opposed
decisions illustrate the many inconsistencies found throughout Ohio's real
property tax exemption case law. They also exemplify how far the legislature
and the judiciary have moved away from their original stance that the property
must be used by the entity seeking exemption and used exclusively for an
exempt purpose.
19 Id.
20Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 113.
23
But when any society, no matter of what kind, whether scientific, literary, or
religious, enters the common business of life, and uses property for the purpose of
accumulating money, the government should, and we think the statute does, treat it in
the same way persons are dealt with, who are using property in a similar manner, and
engaged in the same business. Government cannot discriminate between the uses which
different societies or individuals will make of the proceeds of their business, and
determine that this society or individual will make a more worthy disposition of the
proceeds of his business than that, and therefore the one shall be taxed and the other
not.
Id. at 114.
24Id. at 115.
25 State ex rel. Univ. of Cincinnati v. Limbach, 553 N.E.2d 1056 (1990). See infra
notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
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For fifty years after the court's decision in Cincinnati College there were
no challenges to the exemption provisions governing educational facilities. It is
possible that the state and the nation were preoccupied with the Civil War and
Reconstruction activities thus diverting their attention to more urgent matters.
The constitutional provision governing charitable and educational
exemptions was amended in 1912 to read "institutions used exclusively for
charitable purposes." 26 It had formerly read "institutions of purely public
charity." 27 Under the 1912 amendment to the Ohio Constitution, in order for
property to be exempt for educational purposes, it had to belong to a "public
institution of learning" and be "used exclusively" for educational purposes.28
This language created problems for privately owned schools because they did
not come within the definition of "public institution of learning." It was
therefore necessary for any privately owned school seeking exemption to apply
under the broader charitable exemption provision.29
The confusion created by this situation required the court in later cases to
articulate what fell within the definition of a "public institution of learning."30
Subsequently, the codification of all previously enacted Ohio Laws in 1912
brought exemptions for school houses under section 5349 of the General Code.
There were no substantive changes in the language which affected the school
exemption provisions.
These provisions were involved in Boss v. Hess in which school property
leased to a commercial enterprise was found not exempt.3 ' The court's opinion
seems to suggest that if any of the commercial enterprise's proceeds (other than
the rent paid for the use of the facility) had been used for the endowment and
support of the schools for the free education of youth, the exemption would
have been granted.32
In 1931 the Ohio Constitution was once again amended. 33 Over the next
thirty-four years, the Ohio Supreme Court struggled with the language change
26 OHIO CONST. of 1851, art. XII, § 2 (1851, amended 1912).
27 OHIO CONST. OF 1851, art. XII, § 2 (1851, amended 1905).
28 OHIO CONST. OF 1851, art. XII, § 2 (1851, amended 1912).
29 Gerke v. Purcell, 25 Ohio St. 229 (1874).
30 Id. But see Way'Int. v. Kinney, 552 N.E.2d 908 (1990) (the sale of religious
materials developed by a religious organization specifically for distribution to its own
members did not destroy tax exemption).
31 148 N.E. 347 (1925).
32 Id. at 348.
33 Article XII, section 2, which governs real property tax exemptions, was amended as
follows:
Land and improvements thereon shall be taxed by uniform rule according to value.
[Certain specified public bonds]... shall be exempt from taxation and without limiting
the general power, subject to the provisions of article I of this constitution, to determine
the subjects and methods of taxation or exemptions therefrom, general laws may be
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and how it affected Ohio's real property tax exemptions. Arguably, the
structure of the language is such that the removal of limitations on the
legislature's general power only applied to personal property, Le., the public
bonds specifically mentioned. Nonetheless, the Ohio Supreme Court eventually
used the 1931 amendment to Ohio's Constitution to remove all restraints on the
Ohio Legislature's power to grant exemptions. This change, however, did not
occur quickly or without stringent opposition which resulted in a divided court.
Examination of the struggle to resolve cases before the Ohio Supreme Court
from 1931 to 1965 reveals the conflict and ambiguity resulting from the 1931
constitutional amendment.
In 1942 the Ohio Supreme Court first defined "public institution of
learning" in American Bible Society v. Department of Taxation.34 In its
opinion, the court defined an "institution of learning" for tax exemption
purposes as:
[A]n institution composed of a group of learned men and women associated
together for the purpose of instructing another group of persons, usually young
men and women, in the accumulated knowledge, skill and wisdom of
mankind. An institution of learning must at least embrace the idea of someone,
possessed of knowledge and skill, capable of and in a position to impart such
knowledge and skill to others in position to and capable of learning them.35
This definition did not include an institution whose sole purpose was to publish
and distribute books.36
During 1943 the legislature enacted two additional code sections which
created specific exemptions for universities, colleges, or other educational
institutions owned by municipal corporations and for property vested in any
board of education. 37 Although there have not been any significant challenges
under either of these sections, it is interesting to note that a split Ohio Supreme
Court in In re Applications of University of Cincinnati38 ruled that property
leased for profit by the Cleveland City Board of Education was exempt from
taxation under what is now Ohio Revised Code section 3349.17. This decision
was one of the first in which the court discarded their previous rule that a grant
passed to exempt burying grounds, public schoolhouses, houses used exclusively for
public worship, institutions used exclusively for charitable purposes, and public
property used exclusively for any public purpose ....
OHIO CONST. OF 1851, art. XIII, § 2 (1851, amended 1931).
34 40 N.E.2d 936 (1942).
35 Id. at 939-40.
36 Id. at 940.
37 OHIO CODE ANN. § 4003-15 (Throckmorton's 1945); OHIO CODE ANN. § 4834-16
(Ihrockmorton's 1945).
38 91 N.E.2d 502 (1950).
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of exemption was contingent on both ownership and use for an exempt
purpose.
In 1943 the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that, pursuant to sections 5349 or
5553 of the General Code, property belonging to a privately owned college,
academy or institution of learning which was open to the general public could
be exempt from taxation only if the property were used for a charitable purpose
at the time the exemption was sought.39 The land at issue in Ursuline Academy
v. Board of Tax Appeals4° was purchased by a private girl's school and was not
yet being used as a school at the time the application was made for
exemption. 41 Plans to construct a new high school in the future were not
sufficient grounds to grant exemption.
In Ursuline Academy the court stated that "[i]n the instant case there is no
such present use. Use must be read into any statute enacted prior to the
amendment of section 2 of Article XII, effective January 1, 1931."42 The
"present use" requirement appears to have resulted in substantial abuse of
Ohio's real property tax exemptions. After examining such cases, the
practitioner need only advise his client, who is applying for tax exemption, to
make sure that there is some "present use" of the property in order to meet this
test. In the case of a school, it is easy to imagine the placing of temporary
baseball fields on a piece of vacant land in order to circumvent this obstacle.
Five years after Ursuline Academy, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled in
Cincinnati Board of Education v. Board of Tax Appeals43 that real property
held by a board of education for future building construction was exempt even
though a school house had not yet been erected thereon. 44 The only factual
difference appeared to be that Ursuline Academy was a privately owned school
and the property in the Cincinnati case was owned by a public school district.
If use were actually the test, then ownership should have been irrelevant.
In 1945 another case involving a private girl's school owned by a not-for-
profit corporation was before the Ohio Supreme Court.45 The property that was
the subject of the exemption application was a playground that was made
available for public use during after-school hours and on weekends. The issue
was whether or not the tuition payment by some students of "substantial sums"
destroyed the property's eligibility for exemption. The court's approach was
that the private institution applying for exemption under the educational use
statute must use the property for "exclusively charitable purposes," even
39 Ursuilne Academy v. B.T.A., 49 N.E.2d 674, 680 (1943).
40 49 N.E.2d 674 (1943).
41 Id. at 680.
42 Id. at 676.
43 80 N.E.2d 156 (1948).
44 Id. at 156.
45 College Preparatory School for Girls v. Evatt, 59 N.E.2d 142 (1945).
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though the mission of the institution was the education of children.46 The test
then became the exclusive use of property for charitable purposes and the
availability of the institution's services to the general public.
Application of this standard was apparent in Bloch v. Board of Tax
Appeals.47 In Bloch, the school at issue was organized and operated by a
religious organization for the sole purpose of training men for ministerial
positions. The court held that an essentially private institution that was not
providing educational opportunities to the general public could not be exempt
as a public college or as a charitable institution.48 The court did not retreat
from this position until 1951. In American Committee of Rabbinical Colleges v.
Board of Tax Appeals,49 the Ohio Supreme Court held that tax exemptions
would no longer be dependant upon whether. the institution is open to the
general public so long as there was no view to profit and the property was
being used exclusively for the lawful advancement of both education and
religion.50
In Miami University v. Evatt,51 the Ohio Supreme Court held that
reservation of a life estate in land granted to a university destroyed exemption
for that portion of the property which was used as a private residence.52
Exemption was granted for the remainder of the property being used by the
university for educational purposes.53
In 1948 the Ohio Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether a tax
exemption should be granted for vacant land owned by a school district. In
Cincinnati Board of Education v. Board of Tax Appeals,54 the school board
had purchased land and was actively preparing it for construction of an
educational facility. 55 The Ohio Supreme Court granted the exemption and
enunciated the differing treatment of property used for educational purposes
depending upon whether it is owned by charitable institutions or by public
authorities.
[A] distinction must be made in the exemption of private property which is
ultimately used for a charitable purpose and property purchased by public
authorities for a public purpose and being prepared to serve the public use. The
property in question was purchased by the board of education, a public entity
engaged in governmental function for the benefit of the public. . . . The
46 Id. at 143.
47 59 N.E.2d 145 (1945).
48 Id. at 147.
49 102 N.E.2d 589 (1951).
50 Id.
51 59 N.E.2d 366 (1945).
52 Id. at 367.
53 Id. at 366.
54 80 N.E.2d 156 (1948).
55 Id. at 156.
[Vol. 53:265
OHIO'S REAL PROPERTY EXEMPTIONS
property became subject to exemption from taxation when title vested in the
board of education. 56
The court maintained its approach of strictly construing the exemption statutes
when a privately owned school was at issue, while at the same time giving an
expansionist reading to those statutes when granting exemptions to a public
board of education.
During the late 1940s the court further defined public institutions of
learning and public schools. In Society of Precious Blood v. Board of Tax
Appeals,57 the Ohio Supreme Court made it clear that privately owned
(including property owned by charitable institutions) educational facilities
would not be granted exemption unless there was evidence that the
"educational advantages" of the school are "available to the public
generally." 58 An institution of learning may only be eligible for tax exemptions
if it makes no attempts to restrict admission based on the applicant's religion.5 9
The issue of land which is owned by a public institution of learning and
leased for commercial purposes came before the court again in the 1950s.
Twenty-five years earlier, the court had suggested in dicta that an exemption
would be granted if the proceeds of the lease were used for the "endowment
and support" of education. 60 The Ohio Supreme Court ruled in In re University
of Cincinnati61 that real property owned by the municipal university and rented
commercially was exempt as long as the income from such rental property was
applied to the "exclusive use, endowment and support of the university." 62
This ruling came under section 4003-15 of the General Code governing
municipal universities. This section contains significantly different wording
than that of the statute governing exemptions for state universities. 63 Had the
University of Cincinnati been a state university at that point, instead of a
municipal university, there is a substantial likelihood that the exemption may
have been denied according to the plain language of the statutes. Once again the
inconsistencies in exemption provisions governing different educational entities
are apparent. It is this type of inconsistent treatment which mandates a
complete restructuring of Ohio's real property tax exemption laws. Even
though there are no longer any municipal universities in the State of Ohio, the
Ohio Revised Code sections regulating this type of educational institution
remain intact. One advantage in combining all exemption statutes into one
5 6 Id. at 158.
57 77 N.E.2d 459 (1948).58 Id. at 460.
59 Cleveland Bible College v. B.T.A., 85 N.E.2d 284 (1949).6 0 State cx rel. Boss v. Hess, 148 N.E. 347 (1925).
61 91 N.E.2d 502 (1950).
62 Id.
63 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3345.17 (Anderson 1986).
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chapter of the code would be to eliminate the disparate treatment among the
various educational statutes.
In 1962 Denison University submitted an exemption application for a
college fraternity house.64 Exemption was denied because the facility was not
used exclusively for charitable purposes.65 This appears to be the only case in
which a university or college has applied for exemption of a fraternity or
sorority house owned by a public or private college. It should be noted that the
university, although it was an educational institution, applied for exemption
under Ohio Revised Code section 5709.12, the charitable organization
exemption statute.
Three years later, another case involving Denison University came before
the Ohio Supreme Court.66 In Denison University v. Board of Tax Appeals,67
the university was seeking exemption for three parcels of land. 68 The 1965
Denison University decision dealt with Ohio Revised Code section 5709.07, the
educational exemption statute. This section provided exemption for "[p]ublic
colleges and academies, and all buildings connected therewith, and all lands
connected with public institutions of learning, not used with a view to
profit .... " 69 From the enactment of this section in 1852 until the Dennison
University case in 1965, section 5709.07 had consistently been interpreted to
require that the property be used for an "educational purpose" in order to be
exempt from taxation.70 This had also been the requirement under the 1825 and
1846 statutes. 71 The Denison University court also held that the Ohio
Constitution was not, or was no longer, a limitation on the power of the
General Assembly to enact exemption statutes. 72 This ruling opened a
Pandora's box.
This interpretation has had drastic consequences and has led to some
seemingly absurd situations. The court created more ambiguity in ruling that
Denison University, a private institution of learning, was exempted from
taxation under Ohio Revised Code section 5709.07, rather than being exempted
under the charitable exemption statute as had previously been done. First, the
standard for exemption became whether or not the property was "connected
64 Iennison Univ. v. B.T.A., 183 N.E.2d 773 (1962).
65 Id. at 781.
66 Denison Univ. v. B.T.A., 205 N.E.2d 896 (1965).
67 Id.
68 Id. at 898.
69 OIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5709.07 (Anderson 1986).
70 Denison Univ. v. B.T.A., 183 N.E.2d 773 (1962); College Preparatory School for
Girls v. Evatt, 59 N.E.2d 142 (1945); Miami Univ. v. Evatt, 59 N.E.2d 366 (1945);
Ursuline Academy v. B.T.A., 49 N.E.2d 680 (1943).
71 Kendrick v. Farquhar, 8 Ohio 189 (1837).
72 See infra text accompanying notes 218-21 for a discussion of the impact of
Dennison University upon charitable exemptions.
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with" the private "institution of learning." 73 The court, however, failed to
define what constitutes a private institution of learning. In the absence of any
guidelines, the Board of Tax Appeals ("B.T.A.") has quite simply ruled that
exemption will be based on ownership alone,74 and the Ohio Supreme Court
has appeared to affirm that holding.75
Second, vacant unused land belonging to a private "institution of learning"
is now entitled to tax exemption, without limitation. This unusual interpretation
has caused charitable institutions to argue that they are "institutions of
learning" since the "institutions of learning" exemption is now based on
ownership alone, while the charitable statute (up until 1982) required some
exempt use of the property.76 Litigation over what constitutes an "institution of
learning" increased as many not-for-profit entities argued that they were
"institutions of learning." Since 1965 the B.T.A. has contributed to the
increasing amount of litigation by holding that any institution that engages in
the "dissemination of knowledge" is an "institution of learning." 77 Denison
University has also had a profound effect on the interpretation of the charitable
exemption statutes which are discussed in Section V of this Note.
Two years after Dennison University the legislature enacted Ohio Revised
Code section 3345.12(n), which significantly broadened exemptions granted to
state universities. The addition of this section combined with the existing
exemption statute for state universities, Ohio Revised Code section 3345.17,
greatly expanded exemptions granted to state universities.
In addition, Ohio Revised Code section 5709.07 provided an exemption for
property leased from a private for-profit entity by a state university in
Cleveland State University v. Perk.78 It is unclear why the university chose to
apply for exemption under section 5709.07 when Ohio Revised Code sections
3345.17 and 3345.12(n) were the broader provisions covering exemptions for
state universities. Nevertheless, the Ohio Supreme Court extended section
5709.07 to exempt buildings leased from a for-profit corporation by the
university for a term of years.79
In 1980 the Ohio Supreme Court was asked for clarification on what
constitutes a public institution of learning in American Chemical Society v.
7 Id.
74 See, e.g., Edgecliff College v. Kinney, No. 79-D-263 (Ohio B.T.A. May 29, 1981)
(property owned by a private college, which is leased to a not-for-profit organization that
conducts childbirth education classes, is entitled to exemption).
75 Univ. of Cincinnati v. Limbach, 553 N.E.2d 1056 (1990).
76 See American Chem. Soc'y v. Kinney, 431 N.E.2d 1007 (1982) (no exempt use of
vacant land is required in order to qualify for exemption as an "institution of learning").
77 American Chem. Soc'y v. Kinney, No. 77-B-152, 77-B-153 (Ohio B.T.A. Jan. 26,
1981).
78 268 N.E.2d 577 (1971).79 Id. at 581.
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Kinney.80 The American Chemical Society had applied for exemption of
property occupied by one of its divisions, Chemical Abstracts Services.
American Chemical Society was a not-for-profit, congressionally chartered
organization whose purpose was the advancement of chemistry in all its
branches.81 Chemical Abstracts' mission was to review all chemical data and
chemical engineering research published internationally and reduce it to
abstracts and indexes which were compiled and published weekly for sale to
interested parties. The Ohio Supreme Court denied exemption based on the
grounds that "an institution which has as its essential purpose the summarizing
of chemical research into abstracts which are then sold to interested parties is
not a 'public institution of learning' as that term is used in R.C. 5709.07."82
The court remanded the case to the B.T.A. for a determination of unresolved
issues under Ohio Revised Code sections 5709.12 and 5709.121. Ultimately,
exemption was granted pursuant to Ohio Revised Code section 5709.121, the
charitable exemption statute.83 The court concluded, under the charitable
exemption provisions, that if the property at issue were used "in furtherance of
or incidental to an institution's charter provisions, i.e., charitable, educational,
or public purposes and not with a view to profit, it is exempt from taxation
under R.C. 5709.121." 84
The issue of unused land and prospective use of land by a public institution
of learning was before the Ohio Supreme Court in Ohio Operating Engineers
v. KiMnney.85 The court held that exemption will be granted "if the evidence
shows that the needs of the institution make present use of the land impractical
and that there is an intent to use the land at some reasonable time in the future
for the purposes and objectives of the institution." 86
During the 1980s numerous cases involving the exemption of residences
owned by public schools and colleges came before the B.T.A.8 7 The only case
80 405 N.E.2d 272 (1980).
81 Id. at 273.
82 Id. at 275. The only other cases defining public institution of learning during the
1980s were Board of Tax Appeals' cases. Fairmount Center v. Kinney, No. 81-G-623
(Ohio B.T.A. July 16, 1985) (a not-for-profit company organized to provide "instruction" in
the arts is not an educational institution under Ohio Revised Code § 5709.121, therefore,
real property owned by the company is not entitled to tax exemption); AMORC v. Kinney,
No. 79-B-6776 (Ohio B.T.A. Dec. 1, 1981) (informational lectures presented at lodge
meetings did not meet the criteria set forth for an institution of learning).
83 American Chem. Soc'y v. Kinney, 431 N.E.2d 1007 (1982).
84 Id. at 1007 (syllabus).
85 402 N.E.2d 511 (1980).
86 Id. at 514.
87 Univ. School v. Limbach, No. 83-A-704 (Ohio B.T.A. Feb. 12, 1986) (residences
connected with a public institution of learning and not used with a view to profit are
exempt); Hiramn College v. Limbach, No. 83-D-350 (Ohio B.T.A. Sept. 19, 1985) (private
residences purchased by a private college currently being rented to persons not affiliated
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to come before the Ohio Supreme Court during this period was Miami Valley
School v. Kinney."8 Miami Valley School was a private school for grades
kindergarten through twelve, chartered by the State of Ohio as a college
preparatory school.8 9 Exemption had been denied by the B.T.A. for the
residence of the school's headmaster.90 The school, however, did not employ
security personnel during the hours the school was closed. Therefore, the
headmaster's presence on campus was necessary for security purposes in
addition to his being available to open the school on weekends or evenings. 9 '
In granting exemption, the court cited its earlier decision in Denison University
v. Board of Tax Appeals92 as controlling.
During the 1980s and the 1990s, leasing became one of the most pervasive
and controversial areas of exemptions for educational institutions. Although
many of the cases were decided by the B.T.A., 93 one case was appealed to the
Ohio Supreme Court94 and one was appealed to the Tenth District Court of
Appeals. 95
with the college and being held for use in future expansion projects of the college are not
exempt); Hathaway Brown School v. Kinney, No. 82-B-417 (Ohio B.T.A. June 20, 1985)
(headmaster's residence of a non-profit college preparatory school, which was not located
on same parcel as school, was granted tax exempt status); Ohio State Univ. v. Kinney, No.
81-F-110 (Ohio B.T.A. Aug. 30, 1982) (residence on university's rural veterinary clinic
exempted); Case Western Reserve Univ. v. Kinney, No. 79-C-668 (Ohio B.T.A. Oct. 2,
1981) (private residences are exempt if not used with a view to profit); Fairmount
Montessori v. Kinney, Nos. 77-B-152, 77-B-153 (Ohio B.T.A. Jan. 26, 1981) (exemption
granted for second floor apartment used by school caretaker who provides security services
in addition to his building maintenance duties is exempt).
88 431 N.E.2d 335 (1982).
89 Id. at 335.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 205 N.E.2d 896 (1965).
93 Miami Univ. v. Kinney, No. 81-D-290 (Ohio B.T.A. Sept. 13, 1983) (property
owned by a university and leased for private use and enjoyment of the lessee in exchange
for a specified rental qualifies for real property exemption); Ohio State Univ. v. Kinney,
No. 81-F-164 (Ohio B.T.A. Sept. 9, 1983) (property owned by the university trustees but
leased to a private individual is exempt); Gallipolis City Schools v. Kinney, No. 81-D-377
(Ohio B.T.A. April 25, 1983) (mere title to property alone, without a concomitant
application of such property to a public purpose, in terms of physical use, possession, and
application, does not qualify for exemption on the basis that there might be an application of
the rents, issues, or profits on income from a non-public use for public purposes); Edgecliff
College v. Kinney, No. 79-D-260 (Ohio B.T.A. May 29, 1981) (property owned by a
private college, which is leased to a non-profit organization that conducts childbirth
education classes, was granted exemption).
94 Univ. of Cincinnati v. Limbach, 553 N.E.2d 1056 (1990).
95 Bexley Village v. Limbach, Nos. 89AP-872, 89AP-873, slip op. (Ohio Ct.
App., Franklin Cty., June 28, 1990).
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University of Cincinnati v. Limbach96 involved two buildings which were
leased to separate business entities. The buildings, which comprised twenty-two
percent of the property at issue, were being used as a laundromat and a
convenience store by the private entities leasing the property from the
university. The university's College of Design, Art, Architecture and Planning
was using the other eighty-eight percent of the property at issue. 97 The question
before the court was whether real property owned by the state and held for the
university's benefit, part of which was leased to private parties, was entitled to
exemption under Ohio Revised Code section 3345.17. 98 Crucial to the outcome
of the case was the court's interpretation of language in Ohio Revised Code
section 3345.17 which read "used for the support of such institution." In the
exemption application at issue, the rent from the property went into the
university's general operating fund. The court found that the rental proceeds
were "used for the support of the university." 99 This ruling seems to suggest
that any use of state-owned property held for the benefit of a university is
acceptable as long as the rental proceeds are deposited into the university's
general operating fund.1' ° The court appeared to treat the property as a vacant
land issue, requiring no proof of architectural plans or of specific plans for
future use. The university did, however, suggest that the property would
probably be used as a maintenance garage for the main campus or as a
residence facility for the medical center. 10 1 By mentioning the university's
tentative plans, the court seems to require that there be some future intended
use of the property by the university, although this is not a very strict
requirement since specific plans regarding such use are not necessary.
Apparently, the only substantial restriction left under Ohio Revised Code
section 3345.17 as a result of the court's decision in University of Cincinnati is
that some portion of the property must be currently used by some division or
department of the university. In its opinion, however, the court did not
explicitly set forth a percentage of use that would serve as a minimum for
granting exemptions. The three part test set forth by the B.T.A. and affirmed
by the Ohio Supreme Court in University of Cincinnati for property owned by
a university and leased to a private, for-profit enterprise is: (1) The rent
received must be used for the support of the university; (2) there must be an
intent for future development of the property for university use. and (3) part of
the property must currently be used directly by the university.
96 553 N.E.2d 1056 (1990).
97 Id. at 1057.
9 8 Id.
99 Id. at 1058.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 1057.
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The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals also dealt with the lease issue under a
different fact situation. 1°2 Capital University, a private college, leased the
property at issue on a month-to-month basis from a private, for-profit
developer to use as an auxiliary parking lot for its students. There was no long-
term lease involved. Residents of the private adjoining apartment complex also
used the property for parking. Under Ohio Revised Code section 5709.07, the
court ruled that the unity of ownership and use is not required to satisfy the
"connected with" element of the statute.
Bexley Village has extended the boundaries of real property tax exemption
under Ohio Revised Code section 5709.07. It now appears that "connected
with" under the Bexley Village interpretation of the statutory language requires
only a minimal, if not merely superficial, relationship between the entity
applying for exemption and the use of the property.
As a result of University of Cincinnati and Bexley Village, it seems that
virtually all restrictions on property leased from or to private and public
institutions of learning have been removed. After University of Cincinnati,
practitioners representing educational institutions can advise their clients before
entering into a lease arrangement as to the probability of exemption being
granted for the property.
In 1988 the legislature restructured Ohio Revised Code section 5709.07 to
create distinct subdivisions for each of the following entities whose property is
exempt from real property tax: public schoolhouses,10 3 houses used exclusively
for public worship, 104 and public colleges and academies. 0 5 The recodification
involved only structural changes to facilitate ease of reference when dealing
with the numerous exemptions contained in this one section. None of the
existing substantive language of the section was changed or deleted.106
In spite of the massive body of case law dealing with real property tax
exemptions for educational institutions, there remain many unresolved issues.
The most pervasive of these issues is whether the Ohio Supreme Court will
continue to expand exemptions granted to universities. In essence, it appears
that the Ohio Supreme Court's current interpretation of Ohio Revised Code
section 3345.17 in University of Cincinnati places virtually no limitations on
the type of commercial ventures a state university can lease property to and still
meet the test for real property tax exemption.
A new phenomenon in the academic world can perhaps serve as a more
concrete example of how far the real property tax exemptions have been
1021Bexley Village v. Limbach, Nos. 89AP-872, 89AP-873, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App.,
Franklin Cty., June 28, 1990).
103 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5709.07(A)(1) (Anderson 1989).
104 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5709.07(A)(2) (Anderson 1989).
105 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5709.07(A)(4) (Anderson 1989).
106 There was, however, additional language added to provide an exemption for
church camps. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5709.07(A)(3) (Anderson 1989).
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expanded. Recently, many universities have become the sites for "business
incubators." Under this arrangement, the university enters into a partnership
with a private industry to engage in high-technology research. As part of this
agreement, the university provides the equipment and facilities virtually rent-
free in order to attract the foremost experts in a particular field. This
arrangement is advantageous to a new business, in that there are virtually no
start-up expenses and access to state-of-the-art research facilities. These so
called "business incubators" do provide advantages to the university in that
they afford students in highly specialized fields the opportunity to work along-
side the nation's most prominent experts. Regardless of the -practical
advantages, the question remains as to whether exemption should be granted
for such a facility. Is it "used for the support" of the university or simply a
disguise for what is essentially a for-profit enterprise operating out of
university facilities? Under Ohio Revised Code section 3345.17, it appears that
the court would simply decide these on a case-by-case basis and apply a
standard similar to that in University of Cincinnati.
A more complex issue would arise if the facility were "purchased,
acquired, constructed or owned by a state university or college, or financed in
whole or in part by obligations issued by a state university or college, and used
for the purposes of a state university or college." 107 Ohio Revised Code section
3345.12(N) appears to be an unrestrained grant of exemptions to state
universities. The statute removes restrictions on income received from such
property. Under this section it appears that there would be no limitation on
universities becoming involved in "business incubator" deals or any other for-
profit enterprise as long as the facility is owned or financed through obligations
(i.e., bonds) issued by the university.
These are issues which have not yet been litigated, but which are likely to
occur, considering the advantages they contain for universities suffering from
state funding cuts. Although it is impossible to predict the outcome with
complete accuracy, based on recent court decisions it seems plausible that
judicial expansion of real property tax exemptions for educational purposes will
continue until the legislature places specific restraints in the current statutory
language.
III. PROPERTY USED FOR RELIGIOUS PURPOSES
Article XII, section 2 of the Ohio Constitution grants the legislature
authority to enact laws granting tax exempt status to "houses used exclusively
for public worship." 108 Ohio Revised Code section 5709.07(A)(2) provides an
exemption for "[h]ouses used exclusively for public worship, the books and
107 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3345.12(N) (Anderson 1990).
108 OHIO CONST.,.art. XII, § 2.
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furniture in them, and the ground attached to them that is not leased or
otherwise used with a view to profit and that is necessary for their proper
occupancy, use, and enjoyment."1 °9 In Faith Fellowship Ministries v.
Limbach,110 the Ohio Supreme Court defined public worship as "the open and
free celebration or observance of the rites and ordinances of a religious
organization."'I The court went on to say that worship was "not the everyday
activities of an individual which express devotion to his or her God." 112 In
another case, In re The Bond Hill-Roselawn Hebrew School,113 the Ohio
Supreme Court held that property used "primarily" for public worship met the
"exclusive use" requirement set forth in the constitution and the Ohio Revised
Code. 114
Recent decisions of the court have shown a resurgence of emphasis placed
upon the delineation between property used exclusively for public worship and
property used to support public worship. 115 This section of this Note will
provide an understanding of the modern law of tax exemption of church
property by tracing its roots from the Northwest Ordinance of 1787
("Ordinance") to present day legislative enactments and Ohio Supreme Court
decisions.
Even though the Ordinance contained no express provisions granting
property tax exemptions for church-owned property, the language in article iii
of the Ordinance indicates the priority given to religion by state and federal
govemment.' 16 Ohio's first constitutional convention delegates also placed
priority on religion as a means to encourage high moral and ethical standards
among the state's citizens.' 17 Relief from taxation for property used for
religious purposes has been one of the primary methods governments have used
to facilitate this objective. Historically, the power to make the exemption is
grounded in the power to select the subjects of taxation and to apportion the
burden thereof. 118
109 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5709.07(A)(2) (Anderson 1989).
110 513 N.E.2d 1340 (1987).
I IId. at 1343.
112 Id.
113 84 N.E.2d 270 (1949).
114 Ild. at 274.
115 Christian Church of Ohio v. Limbach, 560 N.E.2d 199 (1990).
116 NORTHwEST ORDINANCE of 1787, art. iii ("Religion, morality, and knowledge
being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means
of education shall forever be encouraged.").
117 OHo CONST. of 1802, art. VIII, § 3 ("[A]l men, have a natural and indefeasible
right to worship Almighty God, according to the dictates of conscience.... But religion,
morality and knowledge, being essentially necessary to good government and the happiness
of mankind, schools and the means of instruction shall forever be encouraged by legislative
provision, not inconsistent with the rights of conscience.").
118 Exchange Bank v. Hines, 3 Ohio St. 1, 9 (1853).
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The first major challenge in the area of exemptions for church-owned
property occurred in 1874 when the archbishop of the Roman Catholic Church
for the diocese of Cincinnati sought to have the diocese's parsonages exempted
from taxation.' 19 Gerke v. Purcell'2" provided the court with the opportunity to
delineate the boundaries erected by Article XII, section 2 of the constitution
and the church exemption statute.'21 The Ohio Supreme Court, in interpreting
the constitutional language, ruled that "houses used exclusively for public
worship" meant only the church edifice itself and the property necessary for its
proper use and enjoyment. 122 In regard to the specific request for exemption
for the parsonage, the court held that:
The express authority given in the constitution to exempt buildings of the
description named, carries with it, impliedly, authority to exempt such grounds
as may be reasonably necessary for their use.... [B]ut the ground so annexed
must subserve the same exclusive use to which the building is required to be
devoted ....
... [A] parsonage, although built on ground which might otherwise be
exempt as attached to the church edifice, does not come within the exemption.
The ground in such case is appropriated for a new and different use. Instead of
its being used exclusively for public worship, it becomes a place of private
residence....
... The exemptions authorized are not of such houses as may be used for
the support of public worship, but of houses used exclusively as places of
public worship. 123
Thirty-three years after the court declared parsonages nonexempt in Gerke
v. Purcell, the court was again asked to exempt a church-owned residence. 124
Seeking a way to circumvent the parsonage classification, the church argued
119 Gerke v. Purcell, 25 Ohio St. 229 (1874).
120 Id.
121 Id. at 240.
122 Id. at 248-49.
123 Id. See also Episcopal Parish v. Kinney, 389 N.E.2d 847 (1979) (residences of
church rector and sexton not exempt); Apostolic Bethlehem Temple Church v. Limbach,
No. 87-1-1084 (Ohio B.T.A. Oct. 14, 1988) (sleeping rooms for visiting ministers located
within church building not exempt); Miami Presbyterian Fellowship v. Limbach, No. 85-C-
199 (Ohio B.T.A. Dec. 8, 1987) (church's lodge facility not exempt); Westwood Baptist
Church v. Kinney, No. 82-C-730 (Ohio B.T.A. March 29, 1985) (request for split-listing of
church property denied when property is being used primarily as a minister's residence); St.
Gregory Palamas v. Kinney, No. 81-D-616 (Ohio B.T.A. April 29, 1982) (monasteries not
exempt); St. Francis Cabrini v. Kinney, No. 78-E-93 (Ohio B.T.A. Dec. 13, 1978)
(dormitory for teachers, who are also nuns, exempted); Maple Valley Wesleyan v. Kinney,
No. 78-F-229 (Ohio B.T.A. Aug. 14, 1978) (parsonage, even when used for church
business, is not exempt).124 Watterson v. Halliday, 82 N.E. 962 (1907).
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that the residences of priests and bishops were used for the discharge of many
religious and charitable duties. Emphasizing legislative intent, the court
rejected this reasoning based on the exclusivity language in the church
exemption statute.125 No exemptions were granted unless the property was
used in a manner consistent with the language of the exemption statute. Despite
the fact that the parish houses were frequently used for church-related
activities, they were primarily private residences and therefore, could not be
"houses used exclusively for public worship." 126 The clear emphasis of the
court was in drawing a distinction between ownership and actual use: "There is
no presumption of exemption from taxation because the institution claiming it is
of a religious or charitable nature, for it is perfectly competent for such
institutions to own property clearly subject to taxation." 127
The 1912 Constitution retained the same tax exemption language as the
1851 Constitution as far as church exemptions were concerned. Although
constitutional language did not change, the definition of what constitutes
"public worship" has created much controversy and litigation in the twentieth
century. From 1907 until 1949, the court's strict interpretation of the church
exemption statute remained relatively constant. In Congregational Union v.
Zangerle128 the Ohio Supreme Court held that a large, vacant lot used as a
parking lot by church members did not qualify for exemption since it was not
necessary for the "proper occupancy, use and enjoyment" of the church
building. 129 At this point, the judicial interpretation of the church exemption
statute meant that only the church building and the land clearly necessary for its
existence would come within the "used exclusively for public worship"
language.
In 1949 the Ohio Supreme Court abandoned its former strict construction
and application of the "used exclusively" language contained in the church
exemption statute. The court in In re The Bond Hill-Roselawn Hebrew
School,130 interpreted "exclusive" to mean "primary." 131 Pursuant to General
Code section 5349 exemption was granted for a one and one-half story
building, the first floor of which was used exclusively for public worship and
the second floor as a residence for the caretaker and his family. 132 In essence,
the Ohio Supreme Court chose to construe literally the statutory words,
"houses used exclusively for public worship." Justice Taft attempted to
distinguish the Bond Hill-Roselawn fact situation from the earlier parsonage
125 Id. at 965-66.
126 Id. at 968.
127 Id. at 965.
128 34 N.E.2d 201 (1941).
129 Id. at 202.
130 84 N.E.2d 270 (1949).
131 Id. at 274.
132 Id. at 271.
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cases by stating that, "[w]ith regard to a parish house or parsonage, it is clear
that the primary use of the premises is for residence and any use for public
worship is merely incidental. In the instant case, the .primary use of the
building is for public worship." 133
The Bond Hill-Roselawn primary use test was a signal to the legislature
that additional legislation was needed to govern the increasingly complex
exemption situations. 134 Through the use of the Bond Hill-Roselawn primary
use test, the courts were able to legislate their own standards on a case-by-case
basis as to when property would be eligible for exemption.
Within months of the Ohio Supreme Court's Bond Hill-Roselawn decision,
the Ohio General Assembly amended General Code section 5560, now Ohio
Revised Code section 5713.04, to include a clause known as the split-listing
statute.' 35 The split-listing statute provides exemptions for portions of
improved or unimproved property if the applicant can demonstrate that the
property meets the three-part test enunciated in Ohio Revised Code section
5713.04. First, the entire property must be under a single ownership. Second,
the portion to be exempted must qualify as a separate entity. Third, the separate
entity must be used exclusively for exempt purposes. In order to meet the
133 Id. at 274.
134
Such a literal construction [of "exclusive use"] could prevent any exemption being
given under these words of the Constitution [Article XII, section 2]. It would not be
difficult to show some slight use of any church building for a purpose other than public
worship. It would probably be impossible to prevent such use. The building must be
open to all members of the public if it is to qualify as one used for public worshp. If
someone comes into the building and misuses it, is the exemption to be denied? Such a
literal construction would clearly not be a reasonable construction. The people certainly
intended that the words they used in the Constitution should be given a reasonable
meaning....
Although constitutional provisions for exemption from taxation should be given a
strict construction, that construction should be reasonable and one which will not defeat
the intention which the people expressed by the words which they used.
Id. at 272.
135 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5713.04 (Anderson 1986). The pertinent part of the
split-listing statute reads as follows:
If a separate parcel of improved or unimproved real property has a single
ownership and is so used so that part thereof, if a separate entity, would be exempt
from taxation, and the balance thereof would not be exempt from taxation, the listing
thereof shall be split, and the part thereof used exclusively for an exempt purpose shall
be regarded as a separate entity and be listed as exempt, and the balance thereof used
for a purpose not exempt shall, with the approaches thereto, be listed at its taxable value
and taxed accordingly.
OHIO'S REAL PROPERTY EXEMPTIONS
second part of the test, property may be split vertically, horizontally or
otherwise, but it may not be divided on a percentage of use basis.' 3 6
The split-listing statute is a good example of legislative correction in
Ohio's real property tax exemption law. Case law had repeatedly indicated a
problem when there was use for both exempt and nonexempt purposes.
Enactment of this statute indicates that the legislature perceived the problems
occurring, remedied them by a statutory enactment, and succeeded in
simplifying the exemption process in this type of situation.
New Haven Church of Missionary Baptist v. Board of Tax Appeals 37 is a
good example of how the split-listing statute effectively solved a previously
perplexing and inequitable situation. Prior to the enactment of Ohio Revised
Code section 5713.04, the entire building in Missionary Baptist would have
been denied exemption. The structure for which exemption was sought had two
floors.' 38 The first floor contained an auditorium and classrooms which were
used by the church for religious purposes. A four-room apartment comprised
the second floor and was occupied by a caretaker and his family.139 As a point
of interest, this structure was the same structure involved in the 1949 Bond-Hill
Roselawn case. There the court only had the choice of exempting all of the
property from taxation or denying exemption for the entire property. Under the
new split-listing statute, the court held that the building could be divided
vertically as well as horizontally in order to define the areas entitled to
exemption, and excluding those areas from exemption which were properly
taxable because of their use for nonexempt purposes."40 Closer scrutiny and
revision of other problematic areas of real property tax exemption statutes by
the Ohio legislature could lead to more effective and equitable administration of
tax exemption laws as did the split-listing statute.
A. Prospective Use
The next issue faced by the Ohio Supreme Court was whether property
owned by a church could be exempted from taxation if there was a planned
prospective use for it even though it was not currently being used for a tax
exempt purpose. In Orthodox Hebrew Board of Education v. Tax
Commissioner141 the Ohio Supreme Court held that property purchased for
religious school purposes but not being used for a tax exempt purpose on tax
136 Trustees of Church of God v. B.T.A., 112 N.E.2d 633 (1953); Goldman v. L.B.
Harrison Club, 107 N.E.2d 530 (1952) (the separation cannot be based on either time or
area-ratio percentages).
137 223 N.E.2d 366 (1967).
13 8 Id. at 367.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 369.
141 98 N.E.2d 834 (1951).
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lien day could not be exempted. During the same term the Ohio Supreme Court
ruled that when a church is being torn down and rebuilt during a reasonable
period of time the church does not forfeit its tax exempt status during that
period. 142
In Holy Trinity Protestant Episcopal Church v. Bowers 43 the Ohio
Supreme Court continued to expand the boundaries of what qualified as
prospective use for exemption purposes. The religious institution had purchased
vacant land in 1956 for purposes of erecting a new house of worship, but actual
construction did not begin until 1959.144 During the interim period, the
congregation had conducted fund drives, hired architects and surveyors, and
completed all other requisite steps involved in new building construction. 145
Subsequent cases falling under the prospective use test have been granted
exemption if they met the two-part test established in Holy Trinity: (1) The
owner must be actively working toward use of the land for public worship, and
(2) the applicant must show that the plans are more than a "mere dream" and
will "effectuate actual construction of such houses of public worship within a
reasonable time." 146
B. Lease
Another issue which arises is whether an exemption should be granted for
church-owned property which is leased to another entity. Under Ohio Revised
Code section 5709.07(A)(2), church-owned property leased or otherwise used
142 In re Application of Ohave Scholem Congregation, 101 N.E.2d 767 (1951).
143 173 N.E.2d 682 (1961).
144Id. at 684.
145 In exempting the property, the court stated:
[Intent to use such property for an exempt purpose must be one of substance and
not a mere dream that sometime in the future, if funds can be obtained, the entity would
so use such property. In other words, it must be shown that the entity, at the time the
application for exemption is made, is actively working toward the actual use for the
public benefit....
Thus vacant land purchased by a religious institution for the purpose of erecting a
church thereon is entitled to be exempted from taxation if the institution can present
evidence that it is actively working toward an actual use of such property for a house of
worship.
Id. at 685.
146 Columbus Evangel Temple v. Kinney, No. 80-E-70 (Ohio B.T.A. July 8, 1981)
(denying exemption for lack of a specific time table for construction of church facility). See
also Southside Church v. Limbach, No. 85-E-692 (Ohio B.T.A. April 8, 1987); Tri-County
Baptist v. Limbach, No. 84-G-1126 (Ohio B.T.A. Feb. 4, 1987) (proposed budgets
reflecting money currently being deposited in a building fund for anticipated construction of
new facilities meets test for prospective use).
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with a view to profit fails the "used exclusively for public worship"
requirement and cannot be exempted. 147 The Ohio Supreme Court was first
faced with this issue in 1982 when a religious institution sought exemption for
church-owned property leased to a not-for-profit corporation. 148 Exemption
was denied based on the fact that the church was primarily a religious
institution and therefore was not entitled to tax exemption under Ohio Revised
Code section 5709.12 and 5709.121.149
Land held by a religious society which is leased for a term of years
renewable forever and not subject to revaluation is regarded as the land of the
lessee for purposes of taxation under Ohio Revised Code section 5709.06. It is
feasible to assume that, under section 5709.06, a church could enter into this
specific type of lease with a charitable organization that qualified for tax
exemption and therefore the land would be exempt. Arguably, this section of
the code provides an exception to what previously appeared to be an absolute
bar for purposes of tax exemption when a religious society leased property. It
is not clear, however, whether buildings thereon would be granted
exemption.150
Consideration must also be given to the tax exempt status of property
leased to religious institutions. Under Ohio Revised Code section
5709.07(A)(2), which grants exemption to property used exclusively for public
worship, there is no qualifying language making exemption contingent on
property ownership. The plain language of the statute suggests that property
which would be exempt if owned by a religious institution should also be
exempt if leased to it.151
147 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5709.07(A)(2) (Anderson 1986); Faith Fellowship
Ministries v. Limbach, 513 N.E.2d 1340 (1987).
148 Summit United Methodist Church v. Kinney, 442 N.E.2d 1298 (1982). The church
in this instance was seeking exemption for a building occupied by a not-for-profit Ohio
corporation which provided shelter to victims of domestic violence and their children. There
was no fixed rental agreement, but the corporation paid the utilities, taxes, and upkeep for
the interior of the property. Id. at 1299.
149 Id. at 1299.
150 In these cases, the lease instrument itself would be the pivotal factor. For instance,
in Pilarczyk v. Limbach, No. 83-D-276 (Ohio B.T.A. April 23, 1986), property owned by
a Catholic church was leased to various departments of the State of Ohio. The Board of Tax
Appeals ruled that the property was subject to taxation because the entity seeking exemption
was primarily a religious institution within the meaning of Ohio Rev. Code § 5709.121. If,
however, the State of Ohio had had a lease for a term of years, renewable forever and not
subject to revaluation, the property could have been exempted from taxation.
151 Church of Epiphany v. Rain, 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 449 (1889) (court ruled that
exemption applied to property held by a church as lessee under a perpetual lease); First
Baptist Church of Lone Star Texas v. Limbach, No. 85-E-738 (Ohio B.T.A. Aug. 21,
1987) (B.T.A. ruled that where property was owned by a church and leased to another
church to be used exclusively for public worship purposes, even though the church was of a
different denomination, it is exempt from taxation).
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In 1982 Summit United Methodist Church sought exemption for the
educational wing of a parish center which was leased to The Ohio State
University during the week for use as a day care center for the children of the
university's faculty, staff, and students.152 The educational wing failed to
qualify for tax exemption in Summit United Methodist Church v. Kinney
because it was not used exclusively for public worship. 153
In 1984 Tax Commissioner Joanne Limbach outlined the Ohio Department
of Taxation's policy for granting exemption to property used by a church for a
day care center in a letter addressed to Judith Bunge, Legislative Coordinator
for the Ohio Association for the Education of Young Children (the "Bunge
Letter"). 154 The letter addressed those situations in which a church allowed
another organization to use church property for the purpose of operating a day
care center. It was the Tax Commissioner's position that the Sunmit United
Methodist Church case would not be applied "broadly" to deny exemptions for
day care centers operating in church facilities because the facts in that case
were "unique." 155
In regard to the exemption of child care operations, the Tax Commissioner
decided that the provision of such services could qualify for exemption as a
charitable use of property. The Bunge Letter then set forth four requirements
for exemption of day care centers in church facilities. 156 The letter further
152 Summit United Methodist Church v. Kinney, 455 N.E.2d 669 (1983).
153 Id. at 699.
154 Letter from Joanne Limbach, Tax Commissioner to Judith Bunge, Legislative
Coordinator for the Ohio Association for the Education of Young Children (June 22, 1984)
[hereinafter "Bunge Letter"] (discussing the Ohio Department: of Taxation's position
following the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in the case of Summit United Methodist
Church v. Kinney, 455 N.E.2d 669 (1983)).
155 The Tax Commissioner cited three reasons for not broadly applying the Ohio
Supreme Court's decision in Summit United Methodist Church: (1) The decision was based
in part on the fact that child care services were not available to the general public, but only
to students and employees of the university; (2) the church received a rental payment of
$10,000 in addition to reimbursement for utility costs and other actual costs incurred by the
child care operation; and (3) the "church" building at issue was no longer "actually used for
public worship at any time." Bunge Letter, supra note 153.
156
1. The child care provider is a non-profit corporation organized for the charitable
purpose of providing child care services (The employees of such a nonprofit
corporation may receive reasonable wages or salaries for services performed by them).
2. The child care center must be open to the public without regard to race,
religion, national origin, or place of employment.
3. There must be some evidence that services are provided as a charity to some
children, e.g., sliding scale fees or free services to some.
4. If the child care operation is located in a church building, the church must
provide its facilities without leasing them with a view to profit.
Bunge Letter, supra note 153, at 2.
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cautioned that an "actual lease agreement" would "jeopardize" a grant of
exemption. 157
This letter appears to be an abuse of the administrative power vested in the
Tax Commissioner because nowhere in the Ohio Revised Code is there a
statute authorizing the exemption of such a facility. This administrative policy
was promulgated in spite of the Ohio Supreme Court's holding in Swnmit
United Methodist Church.
The administrative disregard of the Ohio Revised Code did not end with
the Bunge Letter. In 1987 the Tax Commissioner issued an additional policy
statement in regard to exempting church-run day care centers. 158
The Bunge letter did not specifically address those situations in which a
church runs a day care operation in its own building. Where a church runs its
own day care operation, we should not inquire as to its charitable nature.
Rather, such a use of church property by the church itself is like other
incidental uses of church property. Therefore, an exemption should not be
denied to a church for property used by the church for a day care center even
though no sliding scale of fees is in use. 159
If the legislature holds plenary power to grant exemptions and the Ohio
Supreme Court has the authority to interpret those statutes, the question must
be asked whether the Tax Commissioner is granted authority to disregard Ohio
Supreme Court decisions and promulgate exemptions clearly contradictory to
the Ohio Revised Code. Despite the efforts of the legislature to clarify and
enact real property tax exemption laws, actions such as this by administrative
officials completely undermine the fundamental principles upon which this
state's government was founded. This is an example where legislation and case
law made no difference in the granting of exemptions. Perhaps part of the
remedy is to limit the discretion of high-level officials whose job it is to insure
the fair and just administration of Ohio's laws.
C. Fellowship Halls and Church Camps
Often, a religious organization owns property which is used in part for
church functions that are not primarily formal religious services. In such
instances, exemption has been determined on a case-by-case basis. When a
church designates an area as a multi-purpose room or a fellowship hall, the test
is one of primary usage. If the activities conducted in that area meet Ohio
157 Id.
158 Department of Taxation Inter-office Communication from Joanne Limbach, Tax
Commissioner to Carol Mahaffey, Tax Equalization Division Administrator (July 6, 1987).
159 Id.
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Revised Code section 5709.07's "used exclusively for public worship"
language, then exemption will be granted. 160
In Bishop v. Kinney,161 the Ohio Supreme Court applied both the primary
use test and the split exemption statute when portions of a multi-purpose
building had been denied exemption. 162 The Roman Catholic Diocese argued
that the portion denied exemption was used primarily for religious purposes. 163
Under the three-part Bishop test, the portion for which exemption is sought
must be a "separate entity" 164 under a single ownership, and "used exclusively
for exempt purposes." 165 The court's decision in Bishop greatly expanded and
altered the interpretation of Ohio's church exemption statute as it relates to
fellowship halls. As long as the area sought to be exempted is used primarily in
a manner that is "religious in nature," 166 the third prong of the test is met.
Arguably, the Bishop decision is not a sound decision. Ohio Revised Code
section 5709.07 requires use "exclusively for public worship." 167 Nowhere in
the statute is there an exemption for activities that are merely "religious in
nature." This interpretation creates room for abuse of the church exemption
statute, since virtually anything can be considered "religious in nature." It is
this type of language, which the court fails to define, that leads to ambiguity
and confusion in Ohio's real property tax exemption laws.
In 1984 the Ohio Supreme Court was faced with the tax exempt status of
various buildings and grounds classified as a church camp in Moraine Heights
Baptist Church v. Kinney.168 The church-owned 49 acres contained: A chapel,
dormitories, cabins, a cafeteria, a swimming pool, a shelter house, a basketball
160 First Baptist Church v. Kinney, No. 78-B-245 (Ohio B.T.A. May 7, 1980) (multi-
purpose building, including a gymnasium used for recreational purposes, not exempt); The
Annunciation v. Kinney, No. F-962 (Ohio B.T.A. Aug. 11, 1978) (property used primarily
as a social meeting place for a church's young people not exempt because it fails the "public
worship" requirement).
161 442 N.E.2d 764 (1982).
162 Id at 765.
163
The parish hall is a large room with movable partitions which can be used to
create four classrooms. Two days per week, religion classes are held in the hall.
Faculty training programs and curriculum workshops for the parish school of religion
are also held in the hall. The hall is also used for retreats, summer bible school and
engagement encounters. Two Sundays per month, breakfasts are held in the hall after
Mass. Church groups, girl scout groups and other civic organizations hold their
meetings in the hall. One night per week, bingo games are conducted in the hall.
Id. at 764.
164 OHO REV. CODE ANN. § 5713.04 (Anderson 1986).
16 5 Bishop, 442 N.E.2d at 764.
166 Id. at 765.
167 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5709.07 (Anderson 1986).
168 465 N.E.2d 1281 (1984).
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court, and athletic fields. Arguing that all of the property was used primarily
for public worship because it was used for entertaining young people in an
atmosphere in which worship was the primary goal, the church sought
exemption for the entire campground. The court exempted the chapel, but
rejected the church's argument, stating that the remainder of the property was
used merely in support of public worship, thus failing the constitutional test of
"used exclusively for public worship." 169
Ohio Revised Code section 5709.07(A)(3) expresses an emphatic legislative
response to the court's ruling in Moraine Heights. The amendment to Ohio
Revised Code section 5709.07 created a new tax exemption for real property
owned and operated by a church that is used primarily for church retreats or
church camping and is not used as a permanent residence.170 Under this
provision, church property may be used on a limited basis by charitable and
educational institutions if the property is not leased or otherwise made available
with a view to profit.
In a 1987 case, Faith Fellowship Ministries v. Limbach,171 exemption was
requested for a complex of buildings containing a cafeteria, gymnasium and
sleeping rooms. The court found that these portions of the building were
"merely supportive" of the public worship and were therefore outside of the
"used exclusively for public worship" requirement of Ohio Revised Code
section 5709.07.172 It appears that as long as a church can show that the
building is used in a "principal, primary, and essential way to facilitate the
public worship," 173 it will be granted exemption under the Faith Fellowship
test set forth by the Ohio Supreme Court.
D. Unused Land
In the early 1980s as churches became more affluent and acquired greater
amounts of property, the issue of tax exemption for unused lands presented
itself with increasing frequency. 174 Legislative changes following the 1851
Ohio Constitution had removed the specific acreage limitations on exemption
for church owned land. The church exemption statute provided for exemption
169 Id. at 1283.
170 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5709.07(A)(3) (Anderson 1989).
171 513 N.E.2d 1340 (1987).
172 Id. at 1344.
173 Id. at 1345.
174 First Apostolic Church v. Kinney, No. 79-D-377 (Ohio B.T.A. Jan. 20, 1981)
(property purchased for use as an additional access driveway to church building is not
exempt); Trinity United Methodist Church v. Kinney, No. 79-D-677 (Ohio B.T.A. May 14,
1980) (unusable land purchased by a religious institution in order to obtain desired property
is not exempt); St. Elizabeth Ann Seton Church v. Kinney, No. 79-D-678 (Ohio B.T.A.
April 4, 1980) (vacant church property denied exemption).
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of the ground attached to houses of public worship which is necessary for their
proper occupancy, use and enjoyment. By 1985 the B.T.A. had ruled in Brith
Emeth Congregation v. Commissioner of Tax Equalization'75 that the Tax
Commissioner did not have the authority to determine the amount of land
necessary for public worship. The land in question in Brith Emeth
Congregation was purchased to enhance the aesthetic qualities of the church
facility and to serve as a sound barrier as well as a space for outdoor services
and congregational activities.' 76 On appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court, 177 the
exemption was upheld, but the court took great care to emphasize the Tax
Commissioner's authority to decide acreage limitations under Ohio Revised
Code section 5713.08. For the first time, the court created a judicial exemption
for unused land which "functions as a sound barrier to the noise of traffic
travelling by the property." 178
The issue of vacant land surfaced again in Full Gospel Apostolic Church v.
Limbach.179 In Full Gospel the church was denied exemption for forty-seven
acres of land which it claimed should be exempt as a "sound barrier to protect
neighbors from the noise of its Pentecostal meetings, which are sometimes
conducted outside."180 The court stated that the church's quantitative data
showing sporadic use of the property did not sustain the necessity of a forty-
seven-acre sound barrier and was insufficient to grant exemption under an
insulation theory.' 8 '
Practitioners seeking exemptions for substantial acreage surrounding
church facilities used for outdoor revivals and congregational services will need
to show that such outdoor use is more than "sporadic" in order to obtain
exemption for the property. Under the "insulation theory" suggested by the
court in Full Gospel, it appears that scientific or empirical data or both,
proving the need for a "sound barrier" will be sufficient.
E. Regional Headquarters
The most recent case in real property tax exemptions for religious purposes
involved the regional headquarters of a religious organization whose member
churches were located throughout the state. In Christian Church of Ohio v.
Lbmbach182 the property at issue was used as the central administrative office of
175 No. 82-B-1209 (Ohio B.T.A. Dec. 4, 1985).
176 Id. at 2.
177 Brith Emeth Congregation v. Limbach, 514 N.E.2d 874 (1987).
178 Id. at 876.
179 546 N.E.2d 403 (1989).
180 Id. at404.
181 Id.
182 560 N.E.2d 199 (1990).
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member churches. 183 Activities occurring on the property included the general
supervision of member churches and cooperative programs for religious
training, counseling, and placing Christian ministry on college campuses.' 84
No public worship services were ever conducted on this property.
In determining exemption status, the court applied the Faith Fellowship test
that property must be used in a "principal, primary, and essential way to
facilitate the public worship." The court determined that, since there was no
public worship conducted on the property, exemption must be denied.' 85
Perhaps the key to resolving issues of this type is to establish a more definitive
set of guidelines.
What is the scope of the word "facilitate?" A practitioner reading Faith
Fellowship would assume that, by "facilitate," the court meant the definition
found in dictionaries. This type of ambiguity also creates problems at the
administrative level of state government. On the facts of OWistian Church, it
appears that the activities conducted on the property "facilitate" the member
churches in the conducting of worship services, yet exemption was denied. As
this discussion of real property tax exemptions for religious organizations has
shown, numerous factors affect the fair and equitable administration of these
laws. There are still many issues which remain unresolved.
An example which illustrates the need for reform of the state's real
property tax exemption law is when a church engaging in charitable activities
cannot be granted exemption under Ohio Revised Code section 5709.07
because the activity does not constitute "public worship," and the Ohio
Supreme Court has ruled that a church cannot be a charity under Ohio Revised
Code section 5709.12.186 Under this type of logic, a church that sets up a soup
kitchen to feed the poor but never uses that portion of their facility for a public
worship service must pay taxes on that facility.
When situations such as these arise and there is an obvious absence of case
law at the B.T.A. level, one can presumptively assume that it is an area in
which the Department of Taxation looks the other way while placing a stamp of
approval on the exemption application. Is this administrative discretion, or is it
simply a method of filling the egregious gaps in the statutory provisions?
Again, the recurring instances of administrative inconsistencies, legislative
neglect, and judicial ambiguity suggest the need to restructure the Ohio Revised
Code provisions for real property tax exemptions.
183 Id. at 200.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 See Summit United Methodist Church v. Kinney, 455 N.E.2d 669 (1983); Summit
United Methodist Church v. Kinney, 442 N.E.2d 1298 (1982).
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IV. CHARITABLE EXEMPTIONS
Tax exemptions for charitable purposes have arguably been the most
controversial area in real property tax exemptions. From 1852 until 1965 the
charitable statute, Ohio Revised Code section 5709.12 and its predecessors,
were interpreted to require two things for a grant of exemption: (1) the owner
of the property had to be a "charitable institution"; and (2) the property had to
be "used exclusively for charitable purposes." 187
As a result of a 1968 amendment to this section dealing with homes for the
aged, the General Assembly repealed the requirement that the owner must in all
cases be a "charitable institution." 188 Ohio now has two statutes governing
charitable exemptions: one that requires the owner to be a charitable
institution 189 and one that does not. 190 This statutory ambiguity has resulted in
extensive litigation. Examination of the various issues and elements of
charitable exemptions will clarify settled points of law and illustrate areas
where ambiguities and confusion remain.
A. Charity Defined
What is a charity? An examination of the case law will reveal many types
of organizations that come within the definition of charity. More importantly, it
defines those organizations whose activities are not charitable and therefore are
excluded from exemption. Ohio's first constitutional convention included in
article XII, section 2 a real property tax exemption for "institutions of purely
public charity." 191
Gerke v. Purcell'92 first set forth the two-part test that the legislature later
codified in Revised Statute section 2732.193 The court first examined the nature
of the organization's activities and then examined the facts to determine
whether the property was used to support a charity which was "purely
public." 194 In Gerke, the property at issue was a privately owned school. 195
187 Humphries v. Little Sisters of the Poor, 29 Ohio St. 201 (1876).
188 OHIfo REV. CODE ANN. § 5709.12 (Anderson 1986).
189 Id.
190 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5709.121 (Anderson 1986).
191 OH1o CoNsT. of 1802, art. XII, § 2.
192 25 Ohio St. 229 (1874).
193 Id. at 243-44. The earliest recording of this statute is found in an early publication
compiled by 1. Swan & M. Sayler, REVISED STATUTES OF OHIO SUPPLEMENT 1440
(1880). It is now codified as OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5709.12 (Anderson 1986).
194 Gerke, 25 Ohio St. at 245.
195 Under current exemption law, the private school would be exempted under the
education exemption statute. In 1874, however, private schools had not yet been included
under those statutory provisions and were thus forced to seek exemption as charitable
institutions.
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The court's definition of charity is still used as a guideline today: "A charity,
in a legal sense, includes not only gifts for the benefit of the poor, but
endowments for the advancement of learning, or institutions for the
encouragement of science and art, without any particular reference to the
poor." 196 Similarly, in Cleveland Library Association v. Pelton,197 a library
association was held to be an institution of purely public charity. 198 In
Cleveland Library, the court held that an organization whose purpose was the
"diffusion of useful knowledge, and the acquirement of the arts and sciences,
by the establishment of a library of scientific and miscellaneous books for
general circulation" was "an institution of purely public charity." 199
In 1912 article XII, section 2 of the Ohio Constitution was amended. The
language controlling charitable exemptions was changed from "institutions of
purely public charity" to "institutions used exclusively for charitable
purposes." 200 Zangerle v. Gallagher20 1 was the first Ohio Supreme Court case
after the constitutional amendment which required definition of the "used
exclusively for charitable purposes" language. 202 A majority of the court held
that when a charitable institution holds title to, and possession of, property but
places a deed in escrow to the grantor, the property belongs to the charitable
institution for tax purposes and is entitled to exemption. 203 The split among the
justices in this case indicates the controversial nature of exemptions for
charitable organizations. Four justices issued three opinions concurring in the
judgment but disagreeing upon the grounds for such judgment. Three justices
dissented. This split among the justices is seen more frequently in the area of
charitable exemptions than in any other area of exemption law. It reflects the
ambiguity and conflict found in Ohio's charitable exemption statutes.
The Ohio Supreme Court, in American Issue Publishing v. Evatt,20 4
defined charity as "that which benefits mankind and betters its condition." 205
American Issue Publishing Company was a for-profit organization owned
solely by a not-for-profit corporation. The company was involved in
distributing literature in order to discourage the consumption of alcoholic
beverages. 2 6 American Issue represents further judicial expansion of the
definition of charity. The court held that an organization engaged in
196 25 Ohio St. 229 (1874) (syllabus, fourth paragraph).
197 36 Ohio St. 253 (1880).
198 Id. (syllabus, first paragraph).
199 Id.
200 OHIO CONST. OF 1851, art. XII, § 2 (1851, amended 1912).
201 165 N.E. 709 (1929).
202 I d. at 712.
203 Id.
204 28 N.E.2d 613 (1940).
205 Id. at 614.
206 Id.
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discouraging the consumption of alcoholic beverages came within the definition
of charity because it promoted individual and social welfare.20 7
Definition of "exclusive use" in relation to charitable activities was also at
issue in Incorporated Trustees of Gospel Worker Society v. Evatt.208 In this
case, exemption was denied to a not-for-profit corporation engaged in printing
and selling religious publications with all proceeds going to charity.209 Even
though a major portion of the property was used in this activity, portions of the
property were being used for non-charitable activities. 210 The court ruled that
use of the property, rather than use of the proceeds, was determinative for tax
exemption purposes.211
It was not until 1949 that the Ohio Supreme Court began to set forth a
fairly clear interpretation of the 1912 amendment to article XII, section 2. In
Cleveland Bible College v. Board of Tax Appeals,212 the B.T.A. had denied the
exemption when testimony presented by the college's business manager
revealed that admission to a portion of the college's courses was contingent
upon the student being a member of the Christian religion. 213
In a four-to-three vote the court reversed the denial of exemption. While
two members of the majority based their decisions upon the fact that the school
was in actuality open to the public generally, 214 the other two members of the
majority concluded that the 1912 amendment of article XII, section 2 and the
subsequent change in language of Ohio Revised Code section 5709.12
eliminated the requirement that a charitable institution be open to the general
public to qualify for exemption.215
By a four-to-three vote, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed its decision in
aeveland Bible College when it decided American Committee of Rabbinical
College of Telshe, Inc. v. Board of Tax Appeals.216 The court's continuing
207 Id. This ruling has governed exemptions for organizations such as Alcoholics
Anonymous. The granting of these exemptions under Ohio Revised Code § 5709.12 has yet
to be challenged.
208 42 N.E.2d 900 (1942).
209 Id. at 902.
210 Id. at 901.
211 Id. at 902.
212 85 N.E.2d 284 (1949).
213 Id. at 284.
214 Id. at 290.
215 Id. at 285 (aft, I., concurring).
216 102 N.E.2d 589 (1951). In its opinion, the majority explicitly stated that tax
exemption for charitable institutions no longer depends upon the institution being open to
the general public as long as there is no view to profit and the property is being used
exclusively for the lawful advancement of education or religion. Id. at 590.
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struggle with the meaning of the amended language of article XII, section 2 and
Ohio Revised Code section 5709.12 continued in future cases. 217
The 1965 Denison University v. Board of Tax Appeals218 decision created
as much confusion in the interpretation of Ohio Revised Code section 5709.12
as it did in the educational exemption statutes. Since 1852, the charitable
exemption statute had been interpreted to require that the property (1) belong to
a "charitable institution," and (2) be "used exclusively for charitable
purposes." 219
After Denison University, a bitter debate took place among the seven
members of the Ohio Supreme Court over the interpretation to be given to this
statute. The four-to-three split among the justices first occurred in Philada
Home Fund v. Board of Tax Appeals.220 Four members of the court were
convinced that Denison University had no effect whatsoever on the charitable
exemption statute, and that, if the General Assembly wished to change the one-
hundred-and-fifty-five-year-old interpretation, it would have to do so by
legislation. On the other hand, three members of the court appeared just as
determined to change the standard interpretation of the statute and to base
exemption solely upon ownership of the property by a charitable institution.
The three member minority wanted no requirement that the property be "used
for charitable purposes." This bitter dispute continued from 1967 through 1969
and into 1969, in a series of five cases, with each side holding its ground. 221
There was no change in the membership of the court during these years.
The old rule that the owner had to use the property in order to claim an
exemption was last applied by the Ohio Supreme Court in Lincoln Memorial
Hospital v. Warren.222 In Lincoln Memorial a for-profit corporation leased its
217 See Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Tax Comm'r, 214 N.E.2d 222 (1966) (not-for-
profit corporation, whose primary purpose was to disseminate birth control information,
was found to be a charitable institution under Ohio Revised Code § 5731.09); American
Humanist Ass'n v. B.T.A., 190 N.E.2d 685 (1963) (property of not-for-profit corporation,
which disseminates literature about human progress and welfare declared exempt,
overruling the B.T.A.'s finding that the institution's purpose was not exclusively charitable);
National Headquarters of Disabled American Veterans v. Bowers, 170 N.E.2d 731 (1960)
(property of veteran's organization used by disabled veterans to manufacture Idento-Tags to
be sold to the public is not entitled to exemption. A charitable institution's ownership of
property does not entitle the institution to exemption even though it is organized exclusively
for charitable purposes. "The use, not the ownership, is the test." Id. at 733).
218 205 N.E.2d 896 (1965). See supra text accompanying notes 66-76 (discussing the
impact of Denison University on real property tax exemptions for educational purposes).2 19 Humphries v. Little Sisters of the Poor, 29 Ohio St. 201 (1876).
220 214 N.E.2d 431 (1966).
221 Carmelite Sisters v. Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, 247 N.E.2d 477
(1969); Crestview v. Donahue, 236 N.E.2d 668 (1968); In re Luther Senior City, 224
N.E.2d 352 (1967); Jewish Hosp. Ass'n v. B.T.A., 214 N.E.2d 441 (1966); Philada Home
Fund v. B.T.A., 214 N.E.2d 431 (1966).
222 235 N.E.2d 129 (1968).
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hospital to a not-for-profit corporation that it had created and sought exemption
on the leased facility.223 The court held that ownership and use had to
"coincide"; that is, the owner had to be the user of the property. 224
In the early 1970s the Ohio Revised Code was amended to deal with the
ongoing confusion in charitable exemption.225 Ohio Revised Code section
5709.121(B) contains the problematic language. It grants tax exemption to
property used "in furtherance of or incidental to" charitable purposes.226 The
amendment to this section eliminated the requirement that use and ownership
must coincide in order for exemption to be granted under the charitable
exemption section.
The Ohio Supreme Court ruled in 1973 that section (B) repealed and
reversed almost all previous Ohio decisions rendered since 1847 which dealt
with charitable exemptions and that most issues decided since then must now be
relitigated.2 27 The court in Galvin v. Masonic Toledo Trst,228 stated that the
legislative enactment of Ohio Revised Code section 5709.121 "established
criteria for [the charitable] tax exemption by defining the phrase 'used
exclusively for a charitable purposes,' therefore, any prior inconsistent
decisions of the courts interpreting the phrase must yield." 229 Legislative
inclusion and judicial mention of section (B) illustrates the confusion that
existed and still exists due to an unclear definition of charitable use.
Defining "charity" and "charitable activities" remains as elusive a task
today as it was in 1872. The two most recent Ohio Supreme Court opinions do
little to clarify or give specific guidelines to those seeking exemptions or
223 Id. at 129-30.
224 Id. at 130.
225 As amended, § 5709.121 reads:
Real property and tangible personal property belonging to a charitable or
educational institution or to the state or a political subdivision, shall be considered as
used exclusively for charitable or public purposes by such institution, the state, or
political subdivision, if it is either.
(A) Used by such institution, the state, or political subdivision, or by one or more other
such institutions, the state, or political subdivisions under a lease, sublease, or other
contractual arrangement:
(1) As a community or area center in which presentations in music, dramatics, the arts,
and related fields are made in order to foster public interest and education therein;
(2) For other charitable, educational, or public purposes;
(B) Otherwise made available under the direction or control of such institution, the state,
or political subdivision for use in furtherance of or incidental to its charitable,
educational, or public purposes and not with the view to profit.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5709.121 (Anderson 1986).
226 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5709.121(B) (Anderson 1986).
227 Galvin v. Masonic Toledo Trust, 296 N.E.2d 542, 544 (1973).
228 296 N.E.2d 542 (1973).
229 Id. at 544.
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representing entities opposing an exemption. In Online Computer Library
Center v. Kiney230 the court ruled that a data base firm specializing in
providing to public libraries bibliographic material of member libraries
enhances the ability of libraries to serve the public, but is not a charitable
institution.23 1 The strongest argument against granting exemption was that the
firm charged for its services and records showed a considerable profit. In
another case, a not-for-profit private school operating a used clothing outlet
was also denied exemption because of profits generated by the retail
operation.23 2
Undoubtedly, the confusion will continue until the legislature clarifies or
corrects the ambiguities in Ohio Revised Code section 5709.121. Until then, it
is impossible to predict with any certainty the outcome of charitable exemption
cases.
B. Commercial Use of Property
The commercial use of property owned by charitable institutions has not
been a heavily litigated area. In cases involving commercial use of property by
a charitable institution, the practitioner seeking exemption for such an entity
needs to look closely at how the court defines commercial activity in each
instance. An examination of the cases will help illustrate which types of
commercial activity are acceptable for tax exempt purposes.
One of the earliest cases involving commercial activity was Incorporated
Trustees of Gospel Worker Society v. Evatt.233 The not-for-profit corporation
seeking exemption was engaged in the printing and selling of religious
publications. All of the profits were used for charitable purposes, but the court
denied exemption based on the present use of the property test.
In 1954 the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that real property owned and
operated by a charitable institution without profit was exempt. 23 4 Central to the
court's decision was the fact that the profit making activities were "incidental"
to the institution's main objective. 235 Unfortunately, the word incidental is
ambiguous and the court did not delineate exectly what would be considered
incidental. It is this type of ambiguous language which has resulted in needless
and excessive litigation throughout the years.
Use of a facility to provide support services for recovering alcoholics may
be considered a charitable activity given the right facts. In Akron Arid Club v.
230 464 N.E.2d 572 (1984).
231 Id. at 575.
23 2 See Seven Hills Schools v. Kinney, 503 N.E.2d 163 (1986).
233 42 N.E.2d 900 (1942).
234 Goldman v. Friars Club, 107 N.E.2d 518 (1952).
23 5 Id. at 524.
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Limbach23 6 such a facility was seeking exemption. The main problem was that
the institution operated what appeared to be a profitable, state-licensed bingo
operation on the premises as a means of making money to support its alcohol
recovery program.23 7 The B.T.A. granted exemption because the organization
used the proceeds of the bingo games "for charitable purposes." 238
Another B.T.A. case illustrates the inconsistencies in granting and denying
real property tax exemptions. In Goodwill Industries of Southern Ohio v.
Limbach239 a building used as a retail outlet for used clothing, furniture, and
household goods was granted exemption.24° The B.T.A.'s reasoning is
somewhat confusing. In the paragraph prior to the grant of exemption for the
property, the B.T.A. stated:
The words 'charity' and 'profit' are not compatible. Statutes and case law
are clear that if the use of the property is to generate profit, it can not be shown
that the use is charitable. But an activity that produces income is not
indisputably conducted with a view to profit.241
The facts of the case indicate the goods being sold were received at no cost.
A swimming pool association was granted exemption by the B.T.A. in
Fair Park Swimming Pool Association v. Limbach.242 The association offered
both season memberships and daily admission charges. 243 At various times the
pool had been used at no charge by community organizations. It appears that
the B.T.A. granted exemption because all of the income was used to pay the
pool's operating expenses and that the operation of the pool provided a benefit
for the community.244
The crucial factor in the cases involving commercial activity of a charitable
institution seems to be some nexus between the commercial activity and the
charitable purpose. If this nexus exists, exemption will be granted. It also
appears that the benefit to the community is an important factor. Another
plausible distinction made is between revenue generated to produce profits
which are then used for charitable purposes and revenue generated from
carrying out the charitable institution's exempt function. An excess of revenues
over expenses which are reinvested in charitable purposes is tax exempt, while
the generation of profit in an entrepreneurial sense would be denied exempt
status.
23 6 No. 84-E-724 (Ohio B.T.A. March 24, 1986).
23 7 Id. at 7.
238 Id. at 11.
239 No. 84-B-129 (Ohio B.T.A. Feb. 6, 1987).2 40 1d. at6.
241 Id. at 5.
24 2 No. 84-B-26 (Ohio B.T.A. May 13, 1987).
243 Id. at 2.
244Id. at 4.
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C. Residential Use
Charitable institutions, like religious institutions, have generally been
unsuccessful in their attempts to have residential property granted tax exempt
status. As with the religious exemption statutes, courts have usually held when
applying the charitable institution exemption statutes that residential use is
private use. The only exception to this general rule is when the residential
property is occupied by a person whose presence is crucial to the functioning of
the charitable institution such that it could not continue without his or her
presence.245
One area in which there appears to be no logical explanation for the routine
denial of exemptions is when a charitable institution provides low-rent housing
for needy persons. Here, there is seemingly no explanation to justify the
routine denials. 246 The case of Cincinnati Nature Center v. Board of Tax
Appeals247 enunciates the current position of the Ohio Supreme Court
regarding residences owned by charitable institutions. At issue were two
residences located on the Nature Center's property which were occupied by
employees of the center at no charge. The court ruled that as long as the use of
such residences was "in furtherance of or incidental to its charitable,
educational, or public purpose and not with the view to profit" it would be
exempt from taxation. 248
245 Jewish Hosp. Ass'n v. B.T.A., 214 N.E.2d 441 (1966) (hospital's use of structures
to house residents, interns and graduate nurses is a private use of the premises and not a use
exclusively for charitable purposes); Doctors Hosp. v. B.T.A., 181 N.E.2d 702 (1962)
(residence quarters furnished without charge by charitable hospital to its residents and
interns not exempt as property of institution used exclusively for charitable purposes); St.
Barnabas Nurses Guild v. B.T.A., 83 N.E.2d 229 (1948) (building operated and maintained
by a charitable organization is not exempt when rooms are rented to nurses and the facility
is not used exclusively for charitable purposes); Aultman Hosp. Ass'n v. Evatt, 42 N.E.2d
646 (1942) (property used by a not-for-profit hospital as a home for student nurses is
exempt from taxation because the student nurses' presence was part of the integral function
of the hospital).
246 See, e.g., Cogswell Hall v. Kinney, 506 N.E.2d 209 (1987) (not-for-profit
charitable corporation denied exemption on property used as low-cost housing for needy
women); In re Lutheran Senior City, 224 N.E.2d 352 (1967) (real property owned by a not-
for-profit charitable corporation which is used as low-rent housing for elderly is not exempt
although rents are below cost); Philada Home Fund v. B.T.A., 214 N.E.2d 431 (1966) (real
property of a not-for-profit, charitable corporation used as residence apartments for needy
persons is not exempt even though rents are at or below costs); Battelle Memorial Inst. v.
Kinney, No. F-1007 (Ohio B.T.A. March 6, 1979) (not-for-profit organization providing
residential living facility for paraplegics and quadraplegics is not exempt).
247 357 N.E.2d 381 (1976).
248 Id. at 382.
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Even though the legislative drafting of Ohio Revised Code section
5709.121 appears to have rendered that section useless, the Ohio Supreme
Court and the administrative agencies must deal with it until the legislature
redrafts it. In Cincinnati Nature Center the caretaker's residences were made
available under the "control of" the charitable institution. Since the caretaker
provided security services at all hours,249 this would arguably be a service "in
furtherance of" the institution's purpose.
D. Effect of Leases on Tax Exempt Status
When a charitable institution owns property which has been exempted from
taxation, acquisition of additional property by lease does not render the leased
property exempt.25 0 The general rule in regard to leases is that property leased
by a charitable institution can not be exempt even if it is used exclusively for
charitable purpose.25 1
Enactment of Ohio Revised Code section 5709.121(A) has created an
exception allowing exemption of property leased to a charitable institution by
another charitable institution if the use of the property would otherwise qualify
for exemption. 25 2 Since no cases challenging a lease under this provision have
arisen, it may be inferred that the administrative agencies are granting the
exemptions pursuant to this section or charitable institutions simply have not
yet become aware of this "loophole."
E. Social Use of Property
During the early 1940s the issue arose as to whether property used mainly
for social purposes, even though owned by a charitable institution, could be
granted exemption under Ohio Revised Code section 5709.12. The first case to
reach the Ohio Supreme Court involving use for social purposes involved a
canteen owned by a veteran's association that was used for social activities. 25 3
The canteen was used only by members and was not open to the general
public.25 4 Exemption was denied because the property was not used exclusively
for public purposes.25 5 The court's decision was influenced by the "club
249 Id.
250 Humphries v. Little Sisters of the Poor, 29 Ohio St. 201 (1876).
251Id
.
252 Galvin v. Masonic Toledo Trust, 296 N.E.2d 542, 543 (1973).
253 East Cleveland Post No. 1500, Veterans of Foreign Wars v. B.T.A., 41
N.E.2d 242 (1942).
254 Id. at 242.
255 Id. at 243.
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atmosphere" of the canteen and the fact that its main purpose was to encourage
"friendship and sociability" among its own members. 25 6
For the most part, the "social use" cases have involved either veteran or
fraternal associations. This is an area of real property tax exemption law in
which the Ohio Supreme Court has consistently denied exemptions. In 1949 the
court considered an exemption for property used for both social and charitable
purposes in In re Application of American Legion.25 7 The court set down a rule
that still controls today: real property used for both social and charitable
purposes is disqualified from tax exempt status by its dual usage. 258
One explanation for the court's strict construction in cases involving
veteran associations is that the property is generally used primarily for social
purposes. In 1969 the court decided another case involving the American
Legion, 25 9 that still controls today. The fraternal nature of the organization has
been the controlling factor in these cases. When the central purpose of a not-
for-profit corporation is the formation of a fraternal association composed of all
veterans of the armed forces, the organization's property has been repeatedly
denied exemption due to failure to meet the "used exclusively for charitable
purpose" test.260 During the last twenty years few cases involving social use
have been appealed past the B.T.A. level.26 1
One apparently consistent principle throughout the social use cases is that
the courts and administrative agencies are more liberal in granting exemptions
when the use of the property benefits children and adolescents. Even though
the Boy Scouts of America is a charitable, not-for-profit organization, it would
be hard to deny that its primary purpose is to provide social activities for young
boys. In Northeast Ohio Council, Boy Scouts of America v. Limbach262 the Tax
Commissioner denied exemption for property obtained to construct a scout
256 Id. See also Socialer Turnverein v. B.T.A., 41 N.E.2d 710 (1942) (property
of a social club not exempt as a charitable institution).
257 86 N.E.2d 467 (1949).
2 58 Id. at 469.
259 In re Application of American Legion, 254 N.E.2d 21 (1969).
260 Id. See also Goldman v. Guckenberger, 107 N.E.2d 526 (1952) (previously
exempt property of an American Legion Post which was not used exclusively for charitable
purposes was returned to the taxing scheme).
261 Lions Club Found. v. Limbach, No. 85-G-112 (Ohio B.T.A. Jan. 11, 1988) (Lions
Club activities are primarily fraternal, excluding property from exemption under Ohio
Revised Code § 5709.12); Cincinnati Women's Club v. Kinney, No. 78-A-258 (Ohio
B.T.A. June 30, 1980) (property owned by a private women's social club that is used to
further the education of its members as well as to conduct its incidental charitable uses, does
not qualify for exemption); Kent Coterie Club v. Kinney, No. 78-C-557 (Ohio B.T.A. April
4, 1979) (fraternal activities are not charitable within the terms of Ohio Revised Code
§§ 5709.12 and 5709.121); Bavarian Club v. Kinney, No. 78-F-259 (Ohio B.T.A. Dec. 13,
1978) (not-for-profit corporation whose property is used primarily as a dance and social hall
was not entitled to exemption).2 62 No. 85-E-807 (Ohio B.T.A. April 11, 1987).
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service center. The B.T.A. reversed the Tax COmmissioner's decision and
granted the exemption.263
F. Unused Land
As in all other areas of real property tax exemptions, the issue of whether
unused land qualifies for charitable exemptions has also been controversial.
Unlike the social use cases where the rulings have been fairly consistent, the
unused land cases are inconsistent except when the land involved was held as a
nature preserve.
In Little Miami v. Kinney2 "6 a not-for-profit corporation formed to preserve
the natural, scenic appearance of the Little Miami River sought exemption for
Bass Island.265 Bass Island had been restored from a slum-like residential area
to a natural habitat open to the public.266 The Ohio Supreme Court found that
the preservation of the land was a charitable purpose.267 Little Miami redefined
"charity" to include an activity that had never been recognized as charitable up
until that time.268 It appears that the societal benefits gained from the
preservation of land in its natural state were substantial enough that the court
elevated this purpose to the level of charitable activity. The actions of the court
in Little Miami can be viewed in two very different ways: (1) the court was
modernizing the concept of charity to reflect a societal view that conservation
and ecology were important concerns to present day society; or (2) the court
was creating new law despite the fact that the legislature has never said that
preservation of land by private entities. is a tax exempt purpose.
One of the most controversial cases involving unused land was American
Chemical Society v. Kinney.269 American Chemical represents the broadest
judicial interpretation of the 1969 amendment to Ohio Revised Code section
5709.12, which was the legislative attempt to define "used exclusively for
charitable purposes." Prior to this case, it had apparently been established that
263 Id.
264 428 N.E.2d 859 (1981).
265 Id. at 859-60.
266 Id.
267 Id. at 860.
268 See also Trust for Public Land v. Kinney, No. 81-G-115 (Ohio B.T.A. March 11,
1985) (land acquired and preserved in its natural state by a not-for-profit corporation until a
suitable government agency can acquire the property for a public purpose is exempt); Trust
for Public Land v. Kinney, No. 81-E-116 (Ohio B.T.A. Jan. 7, 1982) (tax exemption
granted for land, but not buildings thereon, owned by a charitable institution which is
preserving the land in its natural state); Nature Conservancy v. Kinney, Nos. 80-D-314, 80-
D- 330 (Ohio B.T.A. Dec. 30, 1981) (charitable institution's nature preserve exempt).
269 431 N.E.2d 1007 (1982).
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American Chemical Society was a charitable institution. 270 In this particular
case, the issue of whether American Chemical Society was a charitable
institution was not litigated regarding the vacant land exemption application.
Here, American Chemical Society sought exemption for fifty acres of vacant,
landscaped land surrounding their tax-exempt buildings.271 The Ohio Supreme
Court held that when landscaped and beautified property surrounding a
charitable institution's buildings is shown to be instrumental in the recruitment,
retention, and productivity of the institution's employees, and such employees
play an integral role in the continued success of the institution, the property is
exempt from taxation.272 From this ruling, it appears that there are no real
boundaries for exemption after the 1969 amendment to Ohio Revised Code
section 5709.12.
G. Homes for the Aged
Exemptions for homes for the aged and independent living facilities are a
fairly recent development in real property tax exemption law. In 1968 the Ohio
Supreme Court denied exemption to a residential apartment complex for the
elderly, ruling that it was not used exclusively for charitable purposes.273 The
basis for this ruling is that residential use is inherently private, not charitable.
Even though the institution offered a guaranteed life care plan, each resident
was charged an admittance fee of $10,000 or more, plus a monthly fee for food
and services. 274 The court applied the Cleveland Osteopathic275 test for
hospitals and found that the main objective of the nursing home was not the
care of the "poor, needy and distressed who [were] unable to pay. "276
A similar facility was also denied exemption in In re Lutheran Senior
City.277 Here the court found that the property at issue was essentially a private
residential apartment facility. 278 Citing Philada Home279 and its similar fact
pattern, the court refused exemption as it had in the past to any property which
270 See i. The Columbus School Board has filed a complaint alleging that the
American Chemical Society is not a charitable institution. The case is currently pending
before the Board of Tax Appeals. Considering past history involving the American
Chemical Society, if the B.T.A. agrees with the school board, the case will likely be
appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. American Chem. Soc'y,
No. 86-H-566 (Ohio B.T.A. filed June 6, 1986).27 1 Amn'ican Cmical, 431 N.E.2d at 1008.
2 72 Id. at 1010.
273 Crestview, Inc. v. Donahue, 236 N.E.2d 668, 669 (1968).
2 7 4 Id at 668.
275 Cleveland Osteopathic Hosp. v. Zangerie, 91 N.E.2d 261 (1950).
276 Cretview, 236 N.E.2d at 669.
277 224 N.E.2d 352 (1967).
278 Id.
279 Philada Home Fund v. B.T.A., 214 N.E.2d 431 (1966).
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was partly or "incidentally" used for private residences. Soon after this ruling,
the Ohio Legislature enacted Ohio Revised Code section 5701.13 containing
exemption guidelines for homes for the aged. 280 The pattern that emerged from
this line of cases was that independent residential apartment units occupied by
elderly residents were denied exemption. Not-for-profit licensed nursing homes
were granted exemption under Carmelite Sisters, St. Rita's Home v. Board of
Review. 281
The first case to reach the Ohio Supreme Court under the newly enacted
statute was Toledo Business & Professional Women's Retirement Living v.
Board of Tax Appeals.282 At issue was the constitutionality of Ohio Revised
Code section 5701.13 and whether the facility met the standards set forth
therein. The court ruled that the enactment of section 5701.13 represented the
"exercise of the constitutional power" of the legislature to "determine
exemptions from taxation."2 83 Furthermore, the functions. of the executive and
judicial branches were limited to applying the criteria set forth by the
280
As used in Title LVII of the Revised Code, and for the purpose of other sections
of the Revised Code which refer specifically to Chapter 5701 or section 5701.13 of the
Revised Code, a 'home for the aged' means a place of residence for aged persons
which meets all of the following standards:
(A) It is owned or operated by a corporation, unincorporated association, or trust
of a charitable, religious, or fraternal nature, which is organized and operated not for
profit, and which is not formed for the pecuniary gain or profit of, and whose net
earnings or any part thereof is not distributable to, its members, trustees, officers, or
other private persons.
(B) Not more than ninety-five percent of the expenses of caring for the residents of
such home comes from the resident, or is paid to the home in behalf of the
residents....
(D) The following services are available, as needed by residents of the home, and
shall be provided, at or below reasonable cost, for the life of each resident without
regard to his ability to continue payment for the full cost thereof:
(1) Lodging;
(2) Prepared food;
(3) Custodial care;
(4) Medical and nursing care;
(5) Such additional services as may be required for the full care of the resident.
A service is provided, within the meaning of this division, if the home pays, or
guarantees the payment, for all reasonable costs of securing such service on behalf of
each resident and it can be secured without unreasonable inconvenience to the residents.
Exemption from taxation shall be accorded, on proper application, only to those
homes which meet the standards and provide the services specified in this section.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5701.13 (Anderson 1986).
281 247 N.E.2d 477 (1969).
282 272 N.E.2d 359 (1971).
283 Id. at 361-62.
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legislature in an exemption statute.284 The court found, however, that the
facility did not meet the standards set forth in section 5701.13.285
The court later affirmed this position in S.E.M. Vila 1H, Inc. v. Kinney.286
Denial of exemption was based upon failure of the congregate living facility to
provide its residents with the level of care set forth in Ohio Revised Code
section 5701.13(D). 287 Additionally, the court held that the facility's retention
of the right to terminate the residency of individuals who became mentally or
physically unable to care for themselves violated Ohio Revised Code section
5701.13(D). 288
The Ohio Supreme Court has repeatedly applied a strict construction
standard to homes for the aged seeking exemption under Ohio Revised Code
section 5701.13. Failure to meet any part of a specified requirement will result
in denial of exemption. 289
In 1987 the legislature amended Ohio Revised Code section 5701.13. The
amendment added a paragraph to define pertinent terms such as "assisted living
284 Id. at 361.
285 Id. at 362. See also S.E.M. Villa 1I, Inc. v. Kinney, No. 78-B-613 (Ohio B.T.A.
Oct. 14, 1980) (congregate living facility for elderly that does not provide all five services
enumerated in Ohio Revised Code § 5701.13 does not qualify for exemption).
286 419 N.E.2d 879 (1981).
287 Id. at 380-81.
The custodial care provided by the appellant [nursing home] consists of the
maintenance of the grounds and common areas, window washing, and shampooing of
rugs. This does not encompass any personal service, such as assisting a resident in
dressing, eating, bathing or cleaning. The commissioner and the board found this to be
insufficient to qualify as 'custodial care' . . . Appellant employs a single nurse who
works a 40-hour week, and dispenses no medicine. Appellant does not employ a
doctor, and medical care is provided by three doctors from the community who make
visits to the facility. Appellant provides examining rooms, but the expense of the
medical care is borne by the residents individually. Both the commissioner and the
board found this to be insufficient to qualify as 'medical and nursing care.' We find this
conclusion neither unreasonable nor unlawful.
Id. 288 Id.
289 See Ohio Presbyterian Homes v. Kinney, 459 N.E.2d 500 (1984) (homes for the
aged not meeting all requirements of Ohio Revised Code § 5701.13 can not be exempted
from taxation); Church of the Brethren v. Kinney, No. 81-D-417 (Ohio B.T.A. Sept. 9,
1983) (home for the aged exemption denied when financial information showed that
amounts paid by or in behalf of elderly residents exceeded ninety-five percent of home's
receipts); Apostolic Christian Home v. Kinney, No. 81-E-397 (Ohio B.T.A. Apr. 29, 1983)
(life care agreement insufficient to qualify institution's retirement unit as property "used
exclusively as a home for the aged").
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facility." 290 One of the major problems with the 1987 amendment was that
assisted living facilities were not clearly required to be licensed by the health
department. An assisted living facility could be exempt, even though it was not
licensed by the health department, as long as it was operated in conjunction
with a licensed nursing home. From 1987 until 1990, there existed numerous
unlicensed assisted living facilities that were on the tax exempt lists.
Section 5701.13 was amended again in 1990 to define "adult care
facility," 291 and to eliminate the prior definition of "assisted living facility."
The amended language included a cross-reference to the nursing home licensing
requirements found in Ohio Revised Code section 3722.04. After the 1990
amendment, in order for a home for the aged to qualify for exemption, it must
have either a nursing home, rest home, or adult care facility license in addition
to meeting the requirements set forth in Ohio Revised Code sections 5701.13
and 5709.12.292 In addition, the amendment eliminated the ninety-five percent
test for income because it had proved virtually impossible to administer when
homes for the aged were applying for exemption. This revision more clearly
excludes those independent living facilities which are essentially residential
apartment buildings for the elderly.293 Furthermore, it effectively eliminated
290 "Assisted living facilities" are residential housing facilities that are operated in
conjunction with a nursing home, provide some routine daily assistance to residents, provide
staff that monitors residents' medical condition and have a twenty-four hour emergency call
section. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5701.13(A)(3) (Anderson 1986).
291 "'Adult care facility' means an adult care facility as defined in section
3722.01 of the Revised Code that is issued a license pursuant to section 3722.04 of the
Revised Code." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5701.13(A)(3) (1990). The definition provided
in section 3722.01 provides:
"Adult care facility" means an adult family home or an adult group home .... any
residence, facility, institution, hotel, assisted living facility, congregate housing project,
or similar facility that provides accomodations and supervision to three to sixteen
unrelated adults, at least three of whom are provided personal care
services,... regardless of how the facility holds itself out to the public.
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3722.01(A)(9) (Anderson 1990).
292 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3722.01(A)(9) (Anderson 1990).
293
"Adult care facility" does not include:
* . . (h) Any residence, institution, hotel, assisted living facility,
congregate housing project or similar facility that provides personal care
services to fewer than three residents or that provides, for any number
of residents, only housing, houskeeping, laundry, meal preparation,
social or recreational activities, maintenance, security, transportation,
and similar services that are not personal care services or skilled nursing
care.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3722.01(A)(9) (Anderson 1990).
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the concept of assisted living as an independent entity not subject to the other
requirements of that code section as had been the case under the 1987 version.
In essence, "assisted living" under the 1987 version was subsumed into the
"rest home/adult care facility" provision of Ohio Revised Code sections
5701.13, 3721.01 and 3721.02.
In Toledo Jewish Home for the Aged v. Limbach294 the facility at issue was
Pelham Manor, a congregate housing facility for the elderly. In discussing the
statutory requirements of section 5701.13, the court stated that the "prefatory
qualification for exemption under the statute is that, for the life of each
resident, the specified services be provided at or below cost regardless of the
resident's ability to continue payment therefor." 295 The facility's failure "to
commit to providing services for the life of each resident, without regard to his
or her ability to pay the full cost thereof" was outcome determinative.296
Exemption was denied because the institution failed to meet the life care
requirement of Ohio Revised Code section 5701.13.
The effectiveness of the 1990 amendment to Ohio Revised Code section
5701.13 remains to be seen since it has only been in effect since November 15,
1990. Many of the issues that arose under the previous versions of the statute
may still remain. It appears, however, that the licensing requirement will
facilitate the handling of applications at the administrative level because the
health department officers must certify many of the same requirements under
the licensing statute as those set forth in section 5701.13.
This is one instance in which legislative restructuring of a code section
appears to be an effective solution to problems that had previously resulted in
abuse of real property tax exemptions. If the legislative intent is not
undermined by abuse at the administrative level or judicial misinterpretation,
then perhaps this type of restructuring throughout the charitable exemption
statutes is the solution needed to eliminate the confusion which now exists.
V. PUBLIC PURPOSE EXEMPTIONS
The general standard for exemption from taxation for government and
public property is that the property must be used exclusively for a public
purpose.2 97 Legislative authorization to exempt "public property used
exclusively for public purposes" comes directly from the Ohio Constitution.29 8
Although this section attempts to address most of the issues and areas
arising under the public purpose exemption statutes, it is beyond the scope of
294 559 N.E.2d 451 (1990).
295 Id. at 453.
296 Id.
297 Oitlo REV. CODE ANN. § 5709.08 (Anderson 1986); Carney v. Cleveland, 180
N.E.2d 14 (1962); Toledo v. Jenkins, 54 N.E.2d 656 (1944).
298 OHIO CONST. art. XII, § 2.
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this Note to deal with the exemption of state and federally owned property. An
extensive body of case law interprets the many statutory provisions in this area
and it would be impossible to adequately address this entire area within the
confines of this Note.
The following material explores the general and specific exemptions
pertaining to public property and the development of case law interpreting
those statutory provisions. Most of the litigation occurring in the area of public
property exemptions has involved the definition of the "used exclusively for
public purposes" requirement, in addition to leases, unused land, and
residences.
A. Used Exclusively for Public Purposes
The first case concerning tax exemption for a public purpose, Toledo v.
Hosler,299 came before the Ohio Supreme Court in 1896. In reversing the
lower court's denial of exemption, the Ohio Supreme Court held that
municipally owned gas wells, pipelines, and pumping stations used by the city
for the conveyance of gas to be consumed by the city and its citizens were used
exclusively for a public purpose and were therefore exempt from taxation.300
In 1950 the Ohio Supreme Court further defined "public property used
exclusively for any public purpose" in Cleveland v. Board of Tax Appeals" 1 so
as not to include property used "merely for a public benefit." 3°2 The property
at issue was a municipal stadium and parking lot for which the city was
claiming exemption under General Code sections 5351 and 5356 (now Ohio
Revised Code sections 5709.08 and 5709.10). Even though the public benefited
from the stadium's operation, that fact alone was not enough to justify
exemption. Primarily, the court seemed to be concerned with the proprietary
nature of the enterprise and the inequity that would be created if the
government-owned facility at issue was granted tax exempt status while an
identical privately owned enterprise could not be considered for tax
exemption.30 3
Six years later, the Ohio Supreme Court distinguished its earlier opinion in
Cleveland v. Board of Tax Appeals when it ruled in Columbus v. Delaware0
that "a public purpose of a proprietary nature is still a public purpose within
the meaning of Section 5709.08, Revised Code."30 5 The effect of the court's
decision was to broaden the meaning of the constitutional language of "used
299 43 N.E. 583 (1896).
300 Id. at 584.
301 91 N.E.2d 480 (1950).
3 02 Id. at 481.
303 Id. at 488.
304 132 N.E.2d 747 (1956).
305 Id. at 748.
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exclusively for a public purpose." Essentially, even though the land was
located in an adjoining county and the use was proprietary in nature, the court
held it came within the "used exclusively for a public purpose" language.3 6
In 1970 the issue of exemption for municipally owned public parks came
before the Ohio Supreme Court.307 The court held, in this case of first
impression, that "land which is available to the public generally on the basis of
equality and to the extent of its capacity without charge . . . for open-air
recreational and educational purposes" was land used exclusively for a public
purpose.3 08
Further judicial expansion of the public property exemption occurred in
Montgomery County Park District v. Kinney.3 9 At issue were three residential
facilities located on park property which were rented to park district personnel
at discount rates in exchange for maintenance and supervisory services related
to the surrounding park lands. The court held that Ohio Revised Code section
5709.10 extended tax exemption to all property owned by park districts,
regardless of its use.310
The Ohio Supreme Court, in its most recent case defining "used
exclusively for a public purpose," held that a parking lot used only by
employees of the State Teachers Retirement Board was not property used
exclusively for a public purpose.3 11 The main arguments for not granting
exemption were the nonessential character of the property312 and the
unavailability of the facility to the general public.3 13 In dicta, the court
suggested that, had there been a "nexus" between the property's use and the
public purpose of the entity, exemption would have been granted. This is a
subtle indicator for those who will be seeking exemptions of this type in the
future.
In order to provide an example of the confusion and inconsistency in real
property tax exemptions, one need only look at a similar case decided under the
charitable exemption statute. In Columbus Neighborhood Housing Service v.
Tdnney314 the property at issue was a parking lot used exclusively by the
306 The land at issue was a water reservoir owned by the City of Columbus, a
municipal corporation. The reservoir was being used to contain and hold water to be sold to
residents of the city and its surrounding suburbs. Id. at 751.307 Muskingum Watershed Conservancy Dist. v. Walton, 257 N.E.2d 392 (1970).
308 Id. at 394.
309 399 N.E.2d 556 (1980).
3 10 Id. at 557.
311 State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Kinney, 429 N.E.2d 1069 (1981).
312 The land was located in a business district with numerous other parking facilities
available. Id. at 1070.
313 The parking lot was only accessible to employees with key cards to operate the
gate. Id.3 14 No. 79-B_671 (Ohio B.T.A. Dec. 14, 1981).
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organization's employees and clients.315 Exemption was granted by the B.T.A.
on the basis that the use of the land was "in furtherance of or incidental to" the
organization's charitable purpose.316 This grant of exemption when compared
to the denial of exemption for the State Teachers Retirement Board's parking
lot which was also used by its employees seems incongruous. For the
practitioner seeking exemption for a client under Ohio Revised Code section
5709.10, the essential element needed to obtain exemption appears to be the
clear establishment of a "nexus" between the property's use and the public
purpose of the entity.
B. Leases
The effect of a lease of public property to a private individual was first
examined by the Ohio Supreme Court in Cincinnati v. Lewis.317 The property
at issue was originally purchased to construct water-works facilities for the
city, but the proposed facility was never actually built. Several years later, the
property was leased as farm land with the revenues going to the city water
department and being used for maintenance. 318 In its holding, the court stated
that qualification for exemption depended upon ownership coinciding with
"exclusive use for a public purpose."319 After an examination of the lease
arrangement, the court held that leased property could only be exempted when
leased by the city for its own use in order to exercise its municipal
functions. 320
In 1958 the Ohio Supreme Court issued an opinion which is contrary to all
prior decisions concerning leases of state-owned property. At issue in Carney
v. Ohio Turnpike Commission321 was whether privately operated service plazas
located along the Ohio Turnpike on land owned by the Ohio Turnpike
Commission were entitled to exemption. Previously, the court had denied
exemption to all state-owned property leased to private individuals. The court
315 Id. at4.
316 Id. at 7. The organization's charitable purpose was to prevent deterioration of
neighborhoods through home improvement programs.
317 63 N.E. 588 (1902).
318 Id. at 589.
319 Id.
320 Id. at 590. See also Board of Park Comm'rs v. B.T.A., 116 N.E.2d 725 (1954)
(public property leased to a not-for-profit corporation cannot be classified as public property
while under the control of lessee); Dayton v. Haines, 102 N.E.2d 590 (1951) (a portion of a
municipally owned airport leased to a federal agency for grain storage does not constitute a
use for public purposes or one incidental to the owner's use of the airport for airport
purposes so as to entitle the owner to exemption from taxation); Division of Conservation
and Natural Resources v. B.T.A., 77 N.E.2d 242 (1948) (real property owned by the state,
but leased to a private citizen who uses it exclusively for private purposes, is not exempt).
321 147 N.E.2d 857 (1958).
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held that the for-profit nature of the privately owned enterprises did not change
"the controlling fact that the project is owned by the public and is devoted
essentially to an exclusive public use." 3 2 2 The court had formerly insisted on
strict construction of the statutory exemptions, but it now shifted to a more
liberal requirement in order to grant the exemption. This expansion appears to
be more than merely superficial. It is in fact a substantive change in the court's
position.
Expansion of exemptions in the area of leased public property continued in
Carney v. leveland Public Library.323 The court held that a ninety-nine-year
lease renewable for two terms was exempt from taxation "to the same extent as
property held in fee by such entity." 324 The court distinguished Dayton v.
Haines,325 because in the case at bar there was unity of ownership and use.326
The court, caught in its own inconsistencies, eventually overruled Dayton v.
Haines pursuant to Ohio Revised Code section 5709.08, in a case that was also
entitled Dayton v. Haines.327 In the latter case, the lessor and lessee were both
public bodies. 328 The only option for the court was to grant exemption since
there was "nothing but a public ownership of that property," and therefore it
was exempt as public under Ohio Revised Code section 5709.08.329
The standard applied to lease cases was again changed in 1961 when the
Ohio Supreme Court ruled that property used for "the benefit of the public"
would be considered as coming within the "used exclusively for any public
purpose language." 330 An auditorium and exhibit hall owned and operated by
the City of Cleveland, but used by concessionaires to conduct trade shows and
conventions, was exempted because there was a "general benefit" to the
community. 3 3 1
The current trend with regard to tax exemption of leased public property
appears to be that the exemption will be granted if there is a benefit to the
general public. This area, however, has not been examined by the Ohio
Supreme Court for almost twenty years. It is possible that the next case could
have a very different outcome depending upon membership changes on the
court.
322 Id. at 860.
323 157 N.E.2d 311 (1959).
324 Id. at 311-12.
325 102 N.E.2d 590 (1951).
326 Carney, 157 N.E.2d at 312.
327 158 N.E.2d 200 (1959).
328 Id. at 201.
329 Id.
33 0 Cleveland v. Carney, 174 N.E.2d 254 (1961).
331 Id. at 259.
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C. Unused Lawd
Whether unused land can be exempt from taxation has become a pervasive
issue in real property tax exemptions. It first appeared in public purpose
exemptions in 1943 when the Akron Public Library sought exemption for
property it had purchased for use in future expansion of its library facilities. 332
The Ohio Supreme Court ruled that the B.T.A. had correctly denied the
exemption because the property was not being used exclusively for public
purposes. 333
In recent years all of the cases involving unused land have terminated at the
B.T.A. level with no appeals to higher courts. 334 As has been seen in other
areas of real property tax exemption law, legislative recodification of the
statutes governing public purpose exemptions is needed. Language clarification
and the compilation of the exemption provisions into a single chapter of the
code would help administrative agencies to process exemption applications
more efficiently. If the guidelines set forth in the statutory provision are clear,
they will not be subject to administrative abuse and judicial misinterpretation,
and Ohio's real property tax exemption system would operate more efficiently.
VI. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis of Ohio's real property tax exemption laws
demonstrates that, as a whole, the statutes governing real property tax
exemptions are not highly regarded for their clarity or ease of administration.
Many of the provisions are outdated and ambiguous. They do not provide
answers to many of the issues that arise in the administration of the real
property tax exemption application process. Frustrated, perhaps by the lack of
clarity, Ohio's courts have been faced with the formidable task of interpreting
language that apparently even the legislature does not understand.
Misinterpretation of the law by administrative officials in some areas of real
property tax exemptions has resulted in inconsistent interpretations.
Continued chaos and confusion appear to be the result of three interrelated
factors: (1) the patchwork nature and structure of the Ohio Revised Code
provide no logic or pattern for those dealing with real property tax exemptions;
332 Pfeiffer v. Jenkins, 46 N.E.2d 767 (1943).
333 Id. at 768.
334 Gahanna Jefferson Bd. of Educ. v. Limbach, No. 86-E-316 (Ohio B.T.A. Oct. 14,
1988) (vacant land owned by a municipal corporation which is contiguous to airport land
and used as a buffer zone is exempt); Board of Comm'rs of Cuyahoga Co. v. Limbach, No.
86-F-540 (Ohio B.T.A. April 8, 1988) (abandoned hospital property, for which a private
buyer is being sought, that is currently owned by a public entity, is not exempt); Brook Park
v. Limbach, No. 85-E-22 (Ohio B.T.A. Sept. 9, 1987) (property purchased by a
municipality to eventually be used for recreational purposes is exempt).
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(2) overlapping statutes create conflicting results; and (3) there are many
unexplained gaps in the exemption provisions of the Ohio Revised Code.
From the cases examined, it is easy to see that the fragmented structure of
the exemption statutes creates an invitation for abuse of the system by those
applying for exemption. If the justification for a tax exemption is that it relieves
society from burdens that would otherwise fall on the state government, then
perhaps it is time to reexamine the values and motives behind real property tax
exemptions.
Unrestrained grants of exemption can not continue indefinitely. At some
point, the citizens of Ohio must decide which real property tax exemptions are
benefits, which are oppressive burdens, and which are flagrant abuses of the
system. Short of a constitutional amendment curbing the plenary power of the
legislature to grant exemptions, it is in the hands of the legislature to rectify the
present abuse and misinterpretation of the real property tax exemption
provisions.
Ultimately, what is needed is specific language clarification of the
individual exemption statutes. The legislature needs to examine the areas in
which ambiguity is resulting in the misinterpretation of the statutes. Statutes
must be drafted to provide the administrative agencies and the courts with clear
definitions and appropriate guidelines for resolving existing problems while
providing safeguards to prevent misinterpretation. Furthermore, consolidation
of all real property tax exemption provisions into one chapter of the Ohio
Revised Code would eliminate the gaps and overlapping statutes which are now
scattered throughout the code provisions. These two changes could provide the
needed coherence in language and requirements that is currently lacking.
This approach would bring some long-needed consistency to Ohio's real
property tax exemption laws. The process of creating a more logical and
coherent set of statutes would be difficult, but not impossible. If, and only if,
this type of restructuring occurs, the ambiguity and confusion which now exists
in Ohio's real property tax exemption laws will be eliminated.
Karen Bond Coriell
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